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Article 6

The Constitution and Sikhs in Britain
Satvinder S. ~ u s s *
"All ages of Belief have been Great;
all of Unbelief have been mean."
R. W. Emerson.

How well does the British Constitution protect religious
freedom? The Sikhs with their uncut hair, beards, and turbans
have centrally posed this delicate question to one of the
reputedly most liberal and tolerant countries in the world.
Sikhism is one of the world's youngest religions, and certainly
Sikhs in Britain should have few misgivings, as they are able
to practice their faith as well as anywhere else, and in some
cases much better. But how much more flexible and
accommodating can Britain's unwritten Constitution be? And
may there be lessons here for other countries? The question is
important both fkom the perspective of being able to provide a
representative analysis of recurrent problems that Sikhs are
facing in the world generally, as well as a particular kind of
religious problem that Britain is having to face with its
minority communities.
There are 17 million Sikhs worldwide,' six million of
whom are settled outside India in places as diverse as East
Africa, Malaysia, Great Britain, Canada and America in
distinct communities. In Britain specifically, Sikhs comprise a
population of 400,000 inhabitants in an ethnic minority
population of just under three million. Although no town in
* Ph.D. Cambridge University; University of Westminster, London; Of Gray's
Inn Barrister; Committee Member of the Bar Human Rights Committee of England
and Wales, 4 King's Bench Walk, Temple London; Fellow of the International
Academy of Freedom of Religion & Belief; Founding Sponsor and Executive
Committee Member of the Discrimination Law Association, London, 1994; Visiting
Professor a t the University of F'ribourg, Switzerland;
Formerly Fellow of
Emmanuel College Cambridge. This Article could not have been completed without
the help of the writer's wife, Rani. The writer is grateful for the valuable
comments of Mr. David Moore and Professor W. Cole Durham during the
preparation of this Article. Needless to say, any remaining errors are his own.
1. KHUSHWANT SINGH& RAGHU FLU, THE SIKHS(1984).
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Britain presently has an ethnic minority population of more
than 50 per cent, this population, which makes up 5.6 per cent
of the total population, is likely to double to six million in the
next 40 years. However, these minorities will still remain very
much a minority, according to the latest census report on the
subject, and will still be less than 10 percent of the total
As a result, their concerns about cultural and
p~pulation.~
religious freedoms are likely to become more-not
less-pressing and governments are going to come under
increasing pressure to address such concerns.
As a Sikh who originates from India, was born in East
Africa, and now lives in Britain, I confess to having a special
interest in these issues as issues of civic rights and of the
Constitution. Yet, the paradox is that a concept of civic rights
and a Constitution are both unknown and unfamiliar to the
ordinary person on the street in Britain. The result is that a
person may well increasingly wish to retain his cultural and
religious identity as the very essence of his being, and yet find
no means of articulating or espousing that right through the
language o r vehicle of the law.
I propose that an answer for such countries as Britain lies
in a Religious Freedom Restoration Act similar to the one
recently passed in the United state^.^ The question of
constitutional reform is presently high on the agenda in
Britain. Various proposals have been put forth such as a bill of
rights, a written constitution and the incorporation of the
European Convention of Human Rights into Britain's domestic
statuted All of these have merit and there is no doubt that
some reform is now inevitable.
But no significant voice has been raised for the passage of
an ordinary statute in Parliament to deal specifically with the
most fundamental concern of the ethnic minority communities:

2. Richard Ford, UICs Ethnic Mnorities Will Double in 40 Years', THE
TIMES(London), January 20, 1994.
3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. ## 2000bb, et. seq. (Supp. V
1993).
4. The literature on this subject is burgeoning, but see especially, A.W.
BRADLEY& KD. EWING, C O N ~ O N AAND
L ADMINISTRATIVELAW 415-430 (11th
ed. 1993); R. DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTSFOR BFUTAIN (1990); I N S m FOR
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH,
A WRITTEN C O N S T I T U FOR
~ O NTHE UNITEDKINGDOM
(Robert Blackburn ed., 1993); JOSEPHJACONELLI,
ENACTING
A BILL OF RIGHTS
& DAWNOLIVER,
THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION
33-56, 79(1980); JEFFREY
JOWELL
108 (3rd ed. 1994); DAWN OLIVER,GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITEDKINGDOM 146-168,
187-217 (Milton Keynes ed., 1991).
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namely, their right to be themselves and to live by their faith
without fear of discrimination. Perhaps this is not surprising
because the protection of individuality, of heterodox opinion, or
even of eccentric conduct, has not been a fundamental purpose
of the British system of government as it is in the American
Constitution. Yet it is clear, in my view, that the passage of a
simple statute on religious freedoms would be far more
consistent with the British system of securing rights through
ordinary legislation5than either an entrenched bill of rights or
a written constitution which would require a radical overhaul.
Incorporation of the European Convention is more appealing
and an attempt was made earlier this year to pass it as a
British act in Parliament by the foremost advocate of civil
rights, Lord Lester of Heme Hill. Introducing the Bill, he
referred to the Convention as "the jewel in the crown" of the
Council of Europe which had been included in the domestic
legislation of every country except Britain and Ireland. Britain
stands particularly indicted in this because between 1970 and
1990, the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg
successfully heard thirty-seven cases against the British
government on such issues as free speech, equality and fair
trials, a higher rate than against any other European country.
Senior judges, including the Lord Chief Justice and Lord
Taylor, are now in favor of incorporation, but the move has
been consistently resisted by the Government, most recently as
being "undesirable and unnecessary in principle and in
practice.*
There are certainly provisions in the European Convention
that would assist the effective protection of religious liberty.
Namely, Article 9, which protects "the right to fieedom of
thought, conscience and religion," and the "[flreedom to
manifest one's religion or beliefs."? It is also the case that
incorporation would be less controversial than formulating a
domestic bill of rights where agreement between political
parties on such issues as the minimum wage and the right to
belong to a trade union would be very difficult.'
5. See infia parts III.B.l-6.
6. Kate Chattaway, Lord Chief Justice Urges Adoption of Human Rights
Law, PRESS AsSW NEWSFILE,
January 25, 1995.
7 . For a recent account of this see W . Cole Durham et al., The Future of
Religious Liberty in Russia, Report of the De Brught Conference on Pending
Russian Legislation Restricting Religious Liberty, 8 EMORY INT1, L. REV. 16-17
(1994).
8. Anthony Lester, Incorporating the Convention, LEGALACTION,April 1990,
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In fact, even the Council of Europe has urged Britain this
year to implement the Convention to prevent cases being
lodged a t S t r a s b ~ u r g .However,
~
the Convention has been
consistently opposed in government as something alien and
unnecessary to Britain's Constitutional traditions. Moreover,
even its chief proponent, Lord Lester, accepts that it is a
"source of general principles" that "is no substitute for detailed
and precise legislation on particular topics, such as race and
sex discrimination . . . ."lo This has been precisely America's
experience, which is why despite the Religious Clauses of the
First Amendment, it-drifted inexorably to the passage of the
detailed Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.
I believe that the argument is even more compelling in the
case of Britain, not because it has no protection for such
freedoms in its Constitution, but because in Britain this is the
accepted way of doing things." There is, therefore, no
conceptual or intellectual difficulty. The only difficulty is that
of deciding to legislate and then of deciding what to include in
the legislation.
I believe that Britain has erred fundamentally in this
respect when it comes to legislating to protect the rights of
religious minorities, and that unless this error is soon rectified
through specific legislation, the demands of religious minorities
will get ever more vocal in the next forty years. I will show
that what Britain has done is to treat the religious problem as
a racial problem that can be resolved through the application of
equality and non-discrimination norms. Consequently, it has
passed in the last thirty years a series of Race Relations Acts
which contain no hint of outlawing discrimination on religious
grounds. l2
Yet, the reality is that whereas racial minorities are often
religious minorities, religious minorities are not necessarily
racial minorities. Consequently, formally neutral and generally
applicable state laws are more likely to lead to offenses against
the rights of religious minorities than against racial minorities,
who are normally only affected if there has been an express
at 26.
9. Daniel Tarsychys, the Secretary-General of the 34 nation Council of
Europe publicly urged the British Government to commit itself to enshrining the
Convention into domestic law. See THE R M E S (London), February 15, 1995.
10. Lester, supra note at 8.
11. See infra parts III.B.1-6.
12. See infia parts IV.B.1-3.
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breach of non-discrimination or equality principles." The
history of the Race Relations legislation, I shall argue, is
woefully deficient in this respect.
The question, however, is why Britain has chosen to
proceed thus. I shall argue that the reasons lie in its own sense
of insecurity about religion, and in a history strewn with a
battle-torn period of constitutional crises, during which
Britain's own right to religious belief was very hard won and
then confirmed through a series of religious liberty statutes.14
This sense of religious insecurity is still evident today. For
example, recently the British government made the teaching of
Christianity a compulsory part of the state school curriculum at
the insistence of the House of Lords in an Act that was only
intended to lay down the essential elements of educational
syllabuses in the national cumculum, even though most people
in Britain today would not regard this education to be essential
to their lives in a secular society.15 To demonstrate the
reasons for this continued tendency in history, I shall have to
take the reader through the relevant parts of British history.
This will then help us to see why the simple passage of a
detailed religious freedom statute would be the most
straightforward and efficacious way of securing rights to
religious freedom.
My argument is that America had to pass the 1993
Religious Freedom bstoration Act following the Smith decision
by the Supreme Court in 1990.16Britain should have passed a
similar act immediately after the House of Lords' decision in

13. The point has been well made in the pages of this journal. See Douglass
Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 221-258.
14. See infra parts III.A.B.3.
15. The Educational Reform Act of 1988 which requires all pupils to take
part in a daily worship "of a broadly Christian character." See The Educational
Reform Act of 1988, $5 6, 7. This has been criticized because "[wlith nearly a third
of the people in this country having no connection with any church or religion, and
with only a minority attending church, compulsory religion in schools is a
dishonesty that nobody who has the moral welfare of children at heart should
support." See also Letters to the Editor: Religious Education Offers a Touchstone for
Faith, THE INDEPENDENT,
February 2, 1995. Similarly, the Archbishop of York, Dr.
John Habgood, the Church of England's second most senior figure has questioned
the need for daily religious assemblies in schools. He said, "It is absolutely clear
that schools do not create Christians and should not be expected to." John O'Leary,
Habgood Questions Need for Religious Assembly in Schools, THE TIMES (London),
January 6, 1995.
16. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Mandla in 1983." Smith cried out for legislation because the
Court held that so long as the law is generally applicable, and
not discriminatorily aimed specifically at religion, the
government may interfere with religion provided that the
government interest was legitimate. Mandla cried out for
legislation (and continues to c r y out) for the far more
fundamental reason that religious discrimination is not
unlawful in Britain. Parliament has not outlawed it in the Race
Relations Act 197618 since such discrimination "does not
constitute a severe burden on members of religious group^."'^
Given this, the only way a Sikh boy, barred from attending a
private school for wearing his turban, could successfully fight
his exclusion from the school by the Headmaster was to show
himself to be subject to discrimination on "ethnic or national"
grounds. In Mandla, the House of Lords held that he could.20
After Smith in 1993, American legislation required States to
provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws,
and in essence, mandated religious accommodation unless
there is found to be a compelling state intere~t.~'
Already a
Sikh boy in California has been able to successfully rely on this
law against a school policy prohibiting the possession of knives
on school property. The District Court held that the school's noknives policy could not be used to ban the possession of
Kirpans (ceremonial knives) that Sikhs must have on their
person as an article of their faith?2 Britain has done nothing,
but should now follow that example, particularly as the
Mandla case has not only failed to protect other religious
groups such as R a ~ t a f a r i a n s ,but
~ ~ also other Sikhs in other

situation^.^^
I believe that adopting or adapting Section 3 of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 has great potential
in securing religious liberties in Britain because it would,
under Britain's constitutional principle of parliamentary
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Mandla v. Dowel1 Lee, [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548.
See infia part IV.B.3.
Mandla v. Dowel1 Lee, [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548, 568 (Lord Templeman).
See facts of Mandla infia part IV.E.
See Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice
and Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REV. 73, 90.
22. See Cheema v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1994). I am very
grateful to Professor Angela Carmella of the Harvard Divinity School for sending
me a transcript of this judgement soon after it was given.
23. Crown Service v. Dawkins, 22 Law Society Gazette R.36 (1991).
24. See infia part IV.E.
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supremacy which means that Parliament's sovereignty is
omnipotent and continuing (at least domestically), impliedly
repeal all earlier inconsistent statutory enactments. Section 3
reads:
(a) Government shall not burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
(b) Exception: Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person:
(I) is in krtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of M h e r i n g that
compelling interest.25

Such an enactment potentially stands to repeal, to the extent of
their inconsistency with the enactment, earlier seventeenth
century statutes that are anti-Catholic because a later
Parliament that is omnipotent and sovereign has legislated
against the continuance of such discriminatory religious
practices.26 Of course, it may be argued that this cannot be
done because those earlier defining statutes of the seventeenth
century are fundamental law, such as the Bill of Rights of
1689, the Union with Scotland Acts of 1706 and the Union with
Ireland Act of 1 8 0 0 . ~I~ will address this point in this

25. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, et. seq. (Supp. V
1993).
26. This is the doctrine of "implied repeal" in British Constitutional law, as
seen in such cases as Ellen Street Estates, Ltd. v. Minister of Health, [I9341 1
K.B. 590, 596, where Lord Justice Maugham said in the Court of Appeal:
The Legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the
form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to
enact that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject-matter
there can be no implied repeal. If in a subsequent Act Parliament chooses
to make it plain that the earlier statute is being to some extent repealed,
effect must be given to that intention just because it is the will of the
Legislature.
Id. at 597 (Maugham, L.J.).
27. For a discussion of the Union with Scotland Acts see infra part III.B.6. I t
has been argued that since the Union with Scotland Acts were antecedent to the
new Parliaments they created, they were constituent Acts bringing into effect a
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN
new state and a new Parliament. See J.B.D. MITCHELL,
NORTHERN IRELAND Chapter 1 (1968). But a contrary view is taken by another
leading constitutional lawyer. See C. MUNRO,STUDIESIN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
Chapter 4 (1987). The fact is that provisions of allegedly fundamental statutes
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paper:'
but I do not accept that legislation can be
fundamental in the conventional sense in a system of
government such as Britain's, and even if it could, surely the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is just as fundamental as
any other statute, just as the Race Relations legislation is, and
just as the European Economic Communities Act of 1972 is,
and yet each of these affected important changes and each was
passed in an ordinary legislative process.
Clearly, therefore, what this tells us is that fbndamental
changes can be wrought in the British system through the
passing of a statute.29 Since Parliament is continuously
omnipotent, it cannot bind the hands of its successors and what
it decides goes. It would be different if Parliamentary
supremacy was self-embracing and not continuous because
then, Parliament could decide each matter only once3' during
have been amended or repealed (e.g. the Universities (Scotland) Act 1853 and the
Irish Church Act 1869) and the Union with Ireland was dissolved in 1922 when
Southern Ireland was given independence. The nature of the Union with Scotland
Acts has been considered in several Scottish cases but has not been decided. In
MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.L.T. 255, Ct. of Sess., two members of the
Scottish public petitioned the Court of Session for a declaration that a
proclamation describing the Queen as "Elizabeth the Second of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain" was illegal. The Lord President (Cooper) held that
there is neither precedent nor authority of any kind for the view that the
domestic Courts of either Scotland or England have jurisdiction to
determine whether a governmental act of the type here in controversy is
or is not to conform to the provisions of a Treaty, least of all when that
Treaty is one under which both Scotland and England ceased to be
independent states and merged their identity in an incorporating union.
Id.
Similarly, in Gibson v. Lord Advocate, 1975 C.M.L.R. 563, Lord Keith declared,
"Like Lord President Cooper I prefer to reserve my opinion on what the position
would be if the United Kingdom Parliament passed an Act purporting to abolish
the Court of Session of the Church of Scotland."
In Ex parte Canon Selwyn, 36 J.P. 54 (1872), the question was raised whether
the Irish Church Act 1869 was validly passed because this Act disestablished and
disendowed the Episcopal church in Ireland, and yet, Article 5 of the Treaty of
Union with Ireland in 1800 had established it forever. It was argued that the Act
of 1869 was contrary to the Coronation Oath and Act of Settlement 1700 (both
discussed i n h parks III.B.2, III.B.5). Chief Justice Cockburn held that "there is no
judicial body in the country by which the validity of an act of parliament could be
questioned." In my view, this is all-revealing, for it is clear that Parliament may
through its sovereignty repeal any act at any time, and there is no statute that
hierarchically ranks above another in the British system of government.
28. See supra note 27 and infin parts III.B.l-6, where some of the so-called
"fundamental" statutes are discussed in detail.
29. See supra note 27 and infi-a parts III.B.l-6.
30. H.L.A. Hart explained that the English doctrine of Parliamentary
Supremacy is nothing more than a "rule of recognitionn employed by the Courts to
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its life-time of five years. It is clear, therefore, that religious
freedoms in Britain can be secured for the Sikhs by a simple
legislative enactment, until such time that more radical
constitutional reform arrangements can be brought into effect.
I will now consider why the Sikhs, as a community in
Britain, need such legislation. To make out a case for this, we
must first consider Sikhism as a
Sikhism in
Britain,32 the nature of Britain's ~ o n s t i t u t i o n , Britain's
~~
historical treatment of religious freedom,34 and Britain's
contemporary protection of the religious rights of Sikhs.35
Then we can determine what Britain must do to better protect
the religious liberties of its Sikhs and other minority
religions.36

Sikhism is an established minority religion in India where
it is followed by eleven million people. It is doctrinally distinct
as a faith3' fkom other religions such as Hinduism and Islam

identify valid rules of law. He said:
the formula "Whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is law* is an
adequate expression of the rule as to the legal competence of Parliament,
and is accepted as an ultimate criterion for the identification of law. The
requirement that at every moment of its existence Parliament should be
free from legal limitations including even those imposed by itself is, after
all, only one interpretation of the ambiguous idea of legal omnipotence. I t
in effect makes a choice between a continuing omnipotence in all matters
not affecting the legislative competence of successive parliaments, and an
unrestricted self-embracing omnipotence the existence of which can only be
enjoyed once. These two questions of omnipotence have their parallel in
two conceptions of an omnipotent God: on the one hand, a God who a t
every moment of His existence enjoys the same powers and so is
incapable of cutting down those powers, and, on the other, a God whose
powers include the power to destroy for the future His omnipotence.
Which form of omnipotence - continuing or self-embracing - our
Parliament enjoys is an empirical question concerning the form of rule
which is accepted as the ultimate criterion in identifying the law.
Hart has no doubt if the present rule is that of continuing sovereignty, then
Parliament "cannot protect its statutes from repeal." See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 145-56 (1961). In my view, this reaflhns that those statutes
cannot be fundamental under the present system.
31. See infra part I.
32. See infia part 11.
33. See infia parts III., 1II.A.
34. See infia parts 1II.B-III.B.6.
35. See infia part IV.
36. See infia part V.
37. The best works on Sikhism are JOSEPH D. CUNNINGHAM,
A HISTORYOF
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which have been followed in India for hundreds of years. It is
necessary to give a brief description of Sikhism here for two
reasons: first, to help explain the basic tenets of the faith to the
general reader who may not be wholly familiar with the Sikhs,
and in so doing, show how those tenets have, over time, in
their history, helped constitute the Sikhs as a distinct people3'
and a nation; second, to show from this brief history how
important sensitive treatment by the law is to religious
minorities who have been so defined by their history and by
their culture.39
Such minorities, wherever they are, will by definition not
have the means to secure the protection of their religious
values through legislative or even judicial process because
those two agencies will be subject to the determining influences
of the religious, political and social ideologies of the majority
faiths in society. A minority faith cannot avail itself of the
luxury of working through the normal democratic processes.
That is what makes it a minority. Yet, there is a critical,
individual element of human dignity in those minorities which
the law of religious liberty must protect, and which the science
of law must perfect if it is to gain both respect and
acceptability from precisely those individuals upon whom it
irnpa~ts.~'
The history of the Sikhs bears this out, for it is not the
culture or the social structure that distinguishes Sikhs from
their fellow brethren in the region of their origin, but their
faith that stands them apart and defines them. For law, this
poses a special challenge. Law has to focus specifically on
religion, to give vent to religion as a specific individual freedom
THE SIKHS: FROM ORIGIN OF THE SIKH NATION TO THE BATTLE
OF SUTLEJ(1966);
MAX k MACAULIFFE,
SIKH RELIGION ITS GURUS, SACREDWRITINGSAND
AUTHORS(1909); COLE
OWEN & P.S. SAMBI, THE SIKHS: THEIR RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS AND PRACTICES (1978); KHUSHWANTSINGH, A HISTORY
OF THE SIKHS

w.

-

(Princeton rev. ed., 1991). The best recent work in the English language is Terence
Thomas, Old Allies, New Neighbors: Sikhs in Britain, in THE GROWTHOF
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY,
BRITAIN FROM 1945 205-241 (G. Parsons ed., 1993). This
provides a detailed account of Sikhs in Britain.
38. The existence of Sikhs as a distinct group in their own right is now
judicially recognized by the House of Lords, the highest court in Britain. See infra
text accompanying notes 154167.
39. Nowhere is this more clear than in the events leading up to the removal
of Prince Duleep Singh from the Punjab to England, to his conversion to
Christianity, and to the events thereafter. See infra part 11.
40. The success of law is ultimately dependent on its consensual acceptance
by those that it affects. Otherwise, the impact of all law will be limited.
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in its own right. However well-meaning the intent, if legal
provisions focus simply and purely on non-discrimination or
equality norms based on racial categorizations, they are bound
to miss the mark. The history of the Sikh religion, rich and
varied as it is, demonstrates this point amply.41
Sikhism originated in Northern India, in a fertile area
known as the Punjab, the land of five rivers. The term Sikh
derives from the ancient Indian classical language, Sanskrit, in
which the word shishya means "disciple" or "to learn." Sikhs
learn from their Guru, which means learned teacher. There
were ten Gurus during the formative years of Sikhism between
1539 and 1708? Of these, the first, Guru Nanak (1469-1539),
and the last, Guru Gobind Singh (1666-1708), are the most
important. Of the ten, only the sixth, Guru Hargobind (15951644), and the tenth took up arms. They did so while the
developing egalitarian ideals of the faith began to question the
existing social and political structure in the Punjab." The
Moghul Emperors in New Delhi saw this questioning as a
~
threat to their authority and resorted to p e r s e ~ u t i o n .The
sixth Guru took up arms after the fifth, Guru A j a n Dev (15631606), was burned alive by Emperor Jahangir for refusing to
convert to Islam.45The irony is that Jahangir was the son of
Emperor Akbar, one of the greatest and most enlightened
rulers the world has ever seen and "who made bigotry
irnp~ssible."~~
The tenth Guru took up arms after the ninth,
Guru Tegh Bahadur (1621-1675), was publicly and
ceremoniously beheaded by Emperor Aurungzeb in the center
of what is now Old Delhi.47It seems that "the Moghul Empire
41. See infra part N on the limitations inherent in the Race Relations
legislation in this respect and in the House of Lords decision in Mandla.
42. These were: Guru Nanak (1469-1539); Guru Angad (1504-1539); Guru
Amar Das (1479-1574); Guru Ram Das (1534-1581); Guru Ajun Dev (1563-1606);
Guru Hargobind (1595-1644); Guru Har Rai (1630-1661); Guru Harkrishan (16561664); Guru Tegh Bahadur (1621-1675); Guru Gobind Singh (1666-1708). The term
"Singh" means "lion* and after the last Guru every Sikh male has this as his
middle name. Every Sikh female has "Kaur" as her middle name and this means
"queen."
43. See the excellent account by Sunita Puri. SUNITA PURI, ADVENT OF SIJSH
RELIGION(1993).
44. See M. A m , THE CRISIS OF EMPIREIN MUGHALNORTH INDIA, AWADH
AND THE PUNJAB 1707-1748 135, 144, 153, 315 (1986); see also R.P. TRIPATHI, RISE
AND FALLOF THE MUGHALEMPIRE (1976).
45. B.S. NIJJAR, PUNJAB UNDER THE MUGHALS(1968); J.N. SARKAR,HISTORY
OF AUWGZEB (1973); GANDASINGH, GURUARJUN'S MARTYRDOM
(1969).
46. K. ARMSTRONG,A HISTORYOF GOD 303 (1993).
47. See J.S. GREWAL& S.S. BAL, GURU GOBIND SINGH: A BIOGRAPHICAL
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never recovered from the destructive bigotry he had unleashed
and sanctified in the name of God,d8 and it was not long
before under the tenth GUN, Guru Gobind Singh, the Sikhs
defeated the M o g h ~ l s .Aside
~ ~ from this testing period, the
faith has remained committed to the pacifist ideals of its
founder, Guru Nanak, except for the apparent resurgence of
militancy in modem times."
Guru Nanak laid down the essential philosophical
foundations of the faith.51 He set out to simplify and
democratize religion. He taught that God was personally
knowable to every man, woman and child through personal
devotion. He spoke and wrote in the ordinary language of the
day. He rejected the select priesthood's ritual incantation of a
sacred Sanskrit text that no one else could easily understand or
employ and he rejected ritual, icons and sacrifice. He preached
personal devotion to a personal God. This devotion was
expressed through meditation (bhakti), the utterance of the
name of God (Nam), and the singing of hymns (shabads). Any
person irrespective of sex, status or creed, could achieve
nirvana or union with God through such personal acts of
devotion. Similarly, any person, whatever his sex, status or
creed, could read the sacred text and officiate as priest a t
religious ceremonies. The sacred text for all Sikhs is called the
Guru Granth Sahib (literally, the Revered Book Guru). The
Granth is written in the Punjabi language, the spoken
language of the Sikhs. It contains 5,894 holy verses in 1430
pages. Its first correct English translation was undertaken by
Max Arthur Macauliffe and published by Oxford University
Press in 1 9 0 9 . ~It~has been described by Miss Pearl S. Buck
who has said of it that:

STUDY (1967); C.H. LOCHLIN,THE GRANTHOF GURU GOBIND SINGHAND THE
KHAL~ABROTHERHOOD
(1971); DALIP SINGH, GURU GOBIND SINGHAND KHALSA
DISCIPLINE
(1992); KARTARSINGH,GURUGOBIND SINGHAND THE MUGHALS(1967).
supra note 46, at 304.
48. ARMSTRONG,
49. See A M , supra note 44,for a h l l account.
50. A thorough account of this is given by the leading writer of Sikh history,
Khushwant Singh. KHUSHWANT SINGH, MY BLXEDINGPUNJAB(1992). See also
COLONEL
P. BHULLAR,THE SIKH MUTINY(1987).
(1969); S.S. KOHLI,PHILOSOPHY
OF
GURUNANAKIN HISTORY
51. J.S. GREWAL,
GURUNANAK(1969): W.H. MCLEOD,GURUNANAKAND THE SIKH RELIGION
(1975);
DEWANSINGH,GURU NANAKAND THE INDIAN MYSTICW l T I O N (1981); GOPAL
SINGH,GURUNANAK(1967).
52. See MACAULIFFE, supm note 37.
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Shri Guru Granth Sahib is a source-book, an expression of
man's loneliness, his aspirations, his longings, his cry to God
and his hunger for communications with that Being. I have
studied the scriptures of other great religions but I do not
find elsewhere the same power of appeal to the heart and
mind as I find in these volumes.53

Written by the first five Gurus until the martyrdom of Guru
Aqan Dev in 1606 who completed it in 1604, the Granth
contains the sacred and divinely inspired Word (Shabad)
uttered by these Gurus from which the disciple gains all
wisdom. Other Gurus often wrote, and sometimes quite
copiously, as did the tenth, Guru Gobind, but these writings
are not included in the ~ r a n t h . ~ ~
By the time of GUN Gobind Singh the faith had developed
over nearly two hundred years. It had achieved much of its
doctrinal objectives. Charity and a sense of communal
responsibility had been instilled. Sikh temples had been
established? Sikhs met regularly a t the temple to share a
common meal (guru-ha-langar) whereby all, no matter king or
pauper, were bound to sit and eat together on equal terms. In
congregational terms, this meal is almost as important as
prayer. Guru Gobind Singh did not seek to elevate himself over
his disciple Sikhs. He insisted that he was just like them.
When he died in 1707, he decreed that there should be no act
of remembrance of him and that all future authority should
henceforward come from the Guru Granth Sahib and the
community, with no further living Guru.
Nevertheless, Guru Gobind's achievements a r e
considerable, not the least of which being that he left the Sikhs
in their final physical form, the most striking representation of
which is the turbaned Sikh male with his uncut hair. Guru
Gobind's most significant achievement was his foundation in
1699 of a fellowship of committed devotional believers called
the Khalsa (or the "Pure Ones"). Each member was initiated
into the order, the Khalsa Panth, by drinking a sweet nectar
(amrit) of water and special sugar crystals stirred with a steel
sword in a steel bowl, by which the initiates assumed the name

53. G.S. SACHA, THE SIKHS AND THEIR WAY OF LIFE17 (1988).
54. Guru Gobind Singh's writings are contained separately in the Dasam
Granth.
55. See J.S. GREWAL,FROM GURU NANAK'1'0 MAHARAJAH
MJIT
SINGH
(1982).
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Singh (Lion). Initiates were then to carry five symbols on their
persons as a continuing affirmation of their faith as the Khalsa
Sikhs and to ensure that their vows were not forgotten. The
symbols were: (i) the uncut hair, the Kes, which men must keep
covered with a turban; (ii) a small comb, Kanga, to keep the
hair clean; (iii) a steel wrist bracelet, Kara, worn always on the
forearm; (iv) a short ceremonial dagger, Kirpan, worn
discreetly; (v) knee length pants or breeches, Kaccha. These
five symbols are known as the Five Ks." They may be
interpreted in doctrinal or ethical terms: the steel bracelet may
symbolize the completeness of faith or remind a Khalsa of his
vows as he performs daily tasks, and pants may symbolize
chastity. Terence Thomas has also written that "viewed
phenomenologically, it is fairly clear that apart fkom the uncut
hair and beard, the signs reflect the military aspect of the Sikh
faith, the bracelet being the remnant of the swordsman's wrist
protector, t h e knee-length pants the dress of t h e
infant~yman."'~
~ c c o r d i nto
~ Alam, the tenth Guru "transformed the
character of the Sikh religion" and "converted it into a militant
organization? In truth, Sikh worship begins and ends with
someone uttering "wahe guru ji ka khalsa" ("the Khalsa is
dedicated to God"). Moreover, militancy or the military aspect
is not a permanent feature of the Khalsa. It is only justifiable
in the quest for justice when all else fails. Guru Gobind Singh
himself viewed the Khalsa as embodying the dualism of the
saintlsoldier (with the saint coming first) both inwardly and
outwardly. This view was doctrinally consistent with the
teachings of Guru Nanak and it is regretful that the saintliness
is far less commented upon these days than the soldierly
qualities.
Nevertheless, the Khalsa is now synonymous with
Sikhism, and the Khalsa predominates in orthodox Sikhism,
despite the fact that thousands of Sikhs follow Guru Nanak in
such sects as the Nirankaris," the Namdharis," and the

56. DALIPSINGH,GURUGOBINDAND SIKHDISCIPLINE(1992).
57. Thomas, supra note 37, at 213.
58. ALAM, supra note 44, at 135.
59. The Nirankaris were founded by Baba Dyal Singh (1783-1854). They were
opposed to idolatry, advocated the reform of rituals in birth, marriage and death,
and were originally limited to urban Sikhs in the north-west.
60. The Namdharis were founded by Bhai Balak Singh (1799-1862). They led
simple austere lives, had their own line of Gurus and denounced rituals. They
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Radhaswarni~.~'
These Sahajdhari (those who are connected)
Sikhs do not necessarily wear turbans or keep their hair long.
They follow a line of living Gurus, unlike the mainstream and
orthodox Sikhs that we have described above. Sometimes they
may refer to themselves as Nanakpathis (Nanak sectarians).
This rich diversity in Sikhism shows the influences on Sikhism
of both Hinduism and Islam, the two great religions of the
subcontinent. Yet, it is crucial to understand that Sikhism is
not a synthesis of these older religions but a new religion in its
own right expounding a new road to the realization of God.62
simply repeated the name of God, or Nam, in prayer (hence Nam-dhari) and
denounced both the claims of superiority and reverence made by the Bedi
descendants of Guru Nanak and the caste system.
61. The Radhaswamis were led by a Hindu banker, Shiv Dyal (1818-1878),
and based their teachings on the lives of the first Gurus in the Guru Granth
Sahib and rejected the rest. They appealed to the clean-shaven Sikhs in the
educated classes who were Hindu-oriented or to the Hindus who were Sikhoriented.
Each one of the these movements started as a reform movement in Sikhism,
because in the nineteenth century, Sikhism as a creed was very much in decline.
Hinduism threatened to absorb it, and British rule, coming ten years after the
death of Maharahah Ranjit, brought with it Christian missionaries. They
introduced an aggressive brand of proselytism hitherto unknown in the Punjab,
employing professional preachers and the printing press for mass dissemination of
THE POLITICSOF FAITH (1986).
their beliefs. See R.A. KAPuR, SIKH SEPARATISM:
These three reform movements, however, were not mainstream movements, and
in 1873 the Singh Sabha (assembly) was founded after four Sikh students of the
Amritsar Mission School converted to Christianity. In 1879 a second Singh Sabha
was set up in Lahore. By 1899, there were over 121 Singh Sabhas which
organized divans (religious meetings), preached reform, established schools and
orphanages, and used preachers to spread reformist ideology throughout the
countryside. Funds came from individual subscriptions and from members of the
Sikh intelligentsia. The movement was firmly mainstream with a huge dint of
populism about it. It addressed itself to genuine communal grievances, and reached
its high-point in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Each Singh Sabha,
in its own way, generated a robust and flourishing debate about Sikh identity and
culture in a way hitherto unknown. The result was that the drift to other faiths
was solidly checked. Since the hallmarks of this movement were educational and
literary, I have always believed that the protection of Sikh religious freedoms in
the West can be maintained through a present adoption of the values and practices
of the Singh Sabha. See Satvinder Juss, A Singh Sabha for the Future?, KHALSA:
A NEWSLEITEROF THE SIKH & PUNJAB1 SOCIETY,UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
10-20
(Lent Term, 1988). For information on the Singh Sabha, the reader is referred to:
S.S. GANDHI, PERSPECTIVES
ON SIKH GURDWARAS LEGISLATION
(1993); GANDHA
MOVEMENTSIN THE
SINGH, THE SINGH SABHA AND OTHER SOCIO-RELIGIOUS
PUNJAB, 1850-1925 (1984); MOHINDER SINGH,THE AKALISTRUGGLE
(1988).
62. Western writers, such as Ernest Trumpp and W.H. McLeod, have
sometimes taken the view that it is. See ~"FULOCHANSINGH, ERNESTTRUMPP AND
W.H. MCLEOD,AS SCHOLARS
OF SIKH HISTORY,RELIGIONAND CULTURE(1994).
Regrettably, some of the language in this work is immoderate. The reader is more
readily recommended DARSHAN SINGH, WESTERN PERSPECTIVE ON THE SIKH
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This can be explained if we look at the social and religious
background that caused Sikhism to develop in the beginning.
The roots of Sikhism lie firmly with Guru Nanak. Guru
Nanak came from the Bhakti movement, which was in turn
influenced by the Sufis. The Sufis emerged in Persia in the
tenth century advocating mystical doctrines of union with God
achieved through the love of God. The Sufis were secretive,
aloof and lived in seclusion. In India, they founded three main
orders: Chisti based around Delhi and the Doab and among
whose members figured the historian Barani and the legendary
poet Amir Khusrau, Suhrawardi based in the Sindh, and
Firdausi based in the Bihar. All three orders of Sufis
dissociated themselves from the established centers of
orthodoxy because they believed that the Ulema, the Muslim
Priesthood, misinterpreted the Quran. They felt that the Ulema
were combining religion and political policy, cooperating with
the sultanate and deviating fkom the original democratic and
egalitarian principles of the Quran. Because the Sufis
remained isolated from the society they opposed, their impact
has been less direct and enduring today than it otherwise
might have been. The leaders of the Bhakti movement, called
Santas (or saints), traced their lineage to the devotional cults of
India and shared common ground with the Sufis, but they did
not believe in Sufi mysticism. Nor were the Bhakti saints aloof
or isolated from the people; they wanted to make their teaching
comprehensible to the less educated. They attacked caste,
institutionalized religion that was rigidly controlled by a
priesthood and the worship of icons, and encouraged women to
join their gatherings where they were taught in the local
vernacular. The Bhakti saints came from a variety of
backgrounds. There were members of lower castes and outcasts
such as Kabir, the weaver, and Ravidas, the leather worker,
both of whose writings were incorporated into the Guru Granth
Sahib. It has been suggested that:
Although Islam predominated culturally in Moghul India,
Hinduism remained vital and creative and some Muslims and
Hindus co-operated in the arts and intellectual projects. The
subcontinent had long been free of religious intolerance and
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the most
creative forms of Hinduism stressed the unity of religious

RELIGION (1991), for a well-balanced and scholarly analysis.
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aspiration: all paths were valid provided that they stressed an
interior love for the one God.63

GUN Nanak himself came from a rural background. He was
the son of a village accountant. Although Hindu, he was
educated through the generosity of a Moslem friend and was
later employed as a storekeeper in the Afghan administration.
Subsequently, he joined the Sufis and left home even though he
was married and had three children. Guru Nanak's most
important contribution, however, came when he left the Sufis
to travel and to teach. He undertook four journeys between
1500 and 1522 ranging from between two to ten years. In these
journeys he travelled across the width of India to Bengal,
across its length to Sri Lanka, up north through Tibet to what
later became the USSR, and finally westward to Mecca in
Saudi Arabia. Eventually, he returned to his family and
children to settle in India and preach to his disciples.64
Historically, GUN Nanak and Kabir (1440-1518) are the most
important saints of the Bhakti movement. Both provided the
turning point for the movement, and both expressed the
sentiments of the urban class and of the village artisans,
groups that were forward-looking and better off. They neither
attempted to reform institutionalized Hinduism by attacking
its methods of worship, nor attempted to submerge
consciousness in devotion. However, whereas Kabir either
denied the Hindu and Muslim ideas of God or equated them in
harmony, GUN Nanak went fbrther and described God without
reference to either. Thus Guru Nanak said: "There is neither
Hindu or Mussulman so whose path should I follow? I shall
follow God's path. God is neither Hindu nor Mussulman and
the path which I follow is God's." The standard and most basic
prayer of the Sikhs, a prayer written by Guru Nanak, in fact,
thus invokes God in all His unaffiliated greatness:
The True One was in the beginning, the True One was in the
primal age,
The True One is now also, 0 Nandk, the True One shall also
be,

63. ARMSTRONG,
supra note 46, at 302. On the Bhakti saints see, F.E. KEAY,
HISFOLLOWERS(1931); W.H. MCLEOD,KABIR, NANAKAND THE EARLY
SIKH PANTHRELIGIOUS CHANGE
AND CULTURAL
DOMINATION (David N. Lorenzen
ed., 1981); J.A. SUBHAN,
SUFISM: ITS SAINTS
AND SHRINES
(1960).
64. See K. VERMA,
GURUNANAKAND THE GOSPELOF DMNE LOTUS (1968).
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By His order bodies are produced; His order cannot be
described.
By His order souls are infused into them; by his order
greatness is obtained.
By His order men are high or low; by His order they obtain
pre-ordained pain or pleasure.
By his order some obtain their reward; by His order others
must ever wander in transmigration.
All are subject to His order; none is exempt from it.
He who understands God's order, 0 Nanak, is never guilty of
egoism.

Thapar states that both Kabir and Nanak developed a new
concept of God for a new religious group: "This concept was
derived from the two existing religious forces, but neither of
them consciously tried to combine and reconcile them?
Terence Thomas says of the Moslem and Hindu influence on
Sikhism that "Sikhs themselveq however, deny the charge of
syncretism and with some ju~tification?~McLeod is more
forthright when he states:
[A] common interpretation of the religion of Guru Nanak
must be rejected. It is not correct to interpret it as a conscious
effort to reconcile Hindu belief and Islam by means of a
synthesis of the two. The intention to reconcile was there, but
not by the path of syncretism. Conventional Hindu belief and
Islam were not regarded as fbndamentally right but as
hdamentally wrong. Neither the Veda nor the Kateb know
the mystery.
The two are rejected, not harmonized in a synthesis of
their finer element^.^'

In sum, Sikhism (like any emerging religion) evolved
against the background of existing religious faiths, namely, the
rich traditions of Islam and Hinduism, but it is not a
continuation of those religious beliefs.68In fact, with its own
particular history, tradition, geographical identity, doctrinal
religious belief, and sacred text, Sikhism is more different from

65. R. THAPAR, A HISTORY
OF INDIA 311 (1966).
66. Thomas, supra note 37, at 210.
67. W.H. MCLEOD,NANAKAND THE SIKH RJ~LIGION 161 (1968).
68. There is an unfortunate tendency to view it as such. See supra note 62.
For example, Miss Armstrong states that "some Muslims and Hindus formed
interfaith societies, the most important of which became Sikhism, founded by Guru
Nanak in the fifteenth century."See ARMSTONG, supra note 46, at 302.
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Islam and Hinduism than Protestantism is from Catholicism.
The differences are more akin to the differences between
Judaism and Christianity, which, like Sikhism, Hinduism and
Islam, also share a common heritage. The fact that the
differences between Sikhism and Hinduism and Islam are
sometimes obscured is principally due to the focus on Sikhs'
physical and marital characteristics, rather than on the
philosophical tenets of their faith, a faith which is amongst the
most fulfilling and liberating for the individual today.

Although a Temple existed in London as early as 1913,
Britain did not receive its first large group of citizen Sikhs
until the 1950s after India received its independence in 1947
and the post-World War I1 "reconstruction period" caused
severe labor shortages. Later, the Sikh expulsion from Uganda
by General Idi Amin in 1972 brought a fresh wave of Sikh
immigrants. Sikhs had a special affection for the British
Crown. The British also held the Sikhs in high regard. They
thought well of their last ruler, Maharajah Ranjit Singh who
sat on the throne of Lahore from 1797 until his death in
1839.~' The Maharajah had extended his kingdom beyond the
Punjab and annexed Kashmir and the North West Frontier,
including the treacherous Khyber Pass. In 1846, T.H.Thornton
wrote in his History of the Punjab that "Ranjit Singh has been
likened to Mehemet Ali and Napoleon. . . . There are some
points in which he resembles both; but estimating his character
with reference to his circumstances and position, he is perhaps
a more remarkable man than either."" In 1898 Alex Gardner
had written in his memoirs that
The Maharajah was indeed one of those master-minds which
only require opportunity to change the face of the globe.
Ranjit Singh made a great and powerfid nation from the
disunited confederacies of the Sikhs and would have carried
his conquests to Delhi or even further, had it not been for the
simultaneous rise and consolidation of the British Empire in
India."

69. See H.T. PRINSEP, ORIGIN OF THE SIKH POWER IN THE PUNJAB AND
POLITICAL LIFEOF MAHARAJAH &WJIT SINGHWITH AN ACCOUNTOF THE RELIGION,
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE SIKHS (1970).
70. T.H.THORNTON, HISTORY
OF THE PUNJAB (1846).
71. SACHA,supra note 53, at 26; see SIRG.C. NARANG,
THE TRANSFORMATION
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It was indeed the rise of the British Empire that was the
most important turning point in Sikh history.72Within four
years of his death, by 1843, all the male members of the Royal
Family had been killed, with the exception of Ranjit Singh's
youngest son, Prince Duleep Singh. He was crowned at the age
of six with his mother, Maharani Jind Kaur, acting as his
regent. The Anglo-Sikh wars took place in 1845-1846 and 18481849. After the defeat of the Sikh armies in 1849 the Punjab
was annexed by the British. Prince Duleep Singh was removed
from his kingdom in 1850. He was converted to Christianity on
March 8th, 1853, and taken to England in 1854.'~ There he
was made a ward of Queen Victoria who had a special affection
for him. Terence Thomas writes that %om being a valiant
enemy the Sikhs became fiercely loyal to the British Crown."74
They maintained this loyalty at the time of the First War of
Indian Independence in 1857 (popularly described as the
Indian Mutiny). They formed the major part of the British
Indian Army fighting courageously in the First and Second
World Wars. Prince Duleep Singh was never able to return to
India. Although in adulthood he reconverted back to Sikhism
and tried to seek assistance from Russia to reclaim his
heritage, he died of a broken heart in Paris on October 22,
1893. He had a majestic residence at Elvedon Hall, in rural
Thetford in Suffolk, of which he was squire. Sikhs in England
undertake an annual pilgrimage to Elvedon Hall. They are
lobbying the British government to have it recognized as a Sikh
historic site. For them, the Sikh connection with Britain has
royal roots in the special personal relationship between Queen
Victoria and Prince Duleep Singh, and this connection predates the modem period of migration which took place a
hundred years afterwards.
The Sikhs prospered under the British after the loss of
their territories. When the Chenab Canal was opened in 1892,
the British offered the Sikhs much land in the Punjab to
convert from desert into green pasture through irrigation.
Khushwant Singh, the leading Sikh historian, writes that
H. WE,
SOLDIER AND TFbIVELLER: MEMOIRS OF ALEXANDER
GARDNER(1970); H. STEINBACH,
THE PUNJAB(1845); THORNTON,
supra note 70. The
sentiments above are echoed in these works.
72. See G . k HENTY, THROUGH THE SIKH WAR(1970).
DDULEEP SINGH:THE MAHARAJAH OF PUNJAB & THE
73. R.R. CHAKRABARTY,
RAJ (1988) (currently out of print).
74. Thomas, supra note 37, at 214.

OF SIKHISM(1969);
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"[tlhe Punjabis became the most prosperous peasantry of India;
and of the Punjabis, the Sikhs became the most prosperous of
all."75The Sikhs became relatively well educated and literate
in English. Aurora considers the Sikhs the fourth most
westernized group in India after the Parsis, Jews and
C h r i ~ t i a n s .Terence
~~
Thomas writes that "Sikhs display an
astonishingly high level of English literacy for a rural
The Sikhs' education and westernization made
it easier for them to migrate to Britain. Yet, with the
significant influx of Sikhs into Britain the question now
becomes, how well has Britain accommodated the Sikhs as a
religious group and protected their religious liberties?
This question is important for a religious minority such as
the Sikhs because no matter how westernized they may be and
willing to adapt in the host country, they ultimately have to
rely on adequate statutory and constitutional protections if
they are to have a measure of security in the practice of their
faith which makes them what they are. When faced with an
influx of new immigrants after the Second World War, in the
1950s,'~ such as Baptists from the West Indies, Sikhs and
Hindus from India, and Muslims from Pakistan and
Bangladesh, Britain did not pass a religious freedom statute.7g
We will later see that it viewed this new influx as a racial
issue and passed a series of Race Discrimination Acts in the
hope that this would secure for them an equality of treatment
at every level.80 Britain, therefore, does not have a religious
freedom statute. To determine whether religious freedoms are
generally protected in other ways, however, we have to turn to
Britain's constitutional arrangements and particularly at how
Britain's Constitution has treated religious liberties.

75. SINGH,supra note 37, at 116-119.
A SOCIOLOGICAL
S m y OF INDIAN
76. G.S. AURORA,THE NEWFRONTIERSMEN:
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
30-31 (1967).
77. Thomas, supra note 37, at 215.
AND
78. For an account, see SATVINDERJUSS, IMMIGRATION, NATIONALITY
C I T ~ N S H I39-42
P
(1993) (Foreword by the Honorable Justice Stephen Sedley).
79. This is because race was the overwhelming factor in the public
AND CITIZENSHIP
perception. One of the earliest accounts is E.J.B. ROSE, COLOUR
(1969).
80. See infia part 1V.B.

502

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

The United Kingdom does not have the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment over which to debate, because unlike
America, the United Kingdom does not have a written
constitution that enshrines basic rights. Britain is generally
perceived as having an historic constitution that has evolved
through its particular history, especially since the English Civil
War in the seventeenth century that led to its present-day
system of government. This historical development has both a
political and a highly religious dimension, although the
religious dimension is often overlooked and hardly ever
mentioned to students of constitutional law.
Perhaps the religious dimension is not mentioned because
the population in general does not regard religion as being of
any great personal significance in Britain today, although
politically it remains important because Parliament has, since
the seventeenth century, secured, through a series of statutory
enactments, state preference for the Protestant faith in the
form of the Established Church of England, over all other
religions (particularly the Catholic religion). This state
preference is part of Britain's constitutional tradition but its
continuance today acts to the detriment of religions such as the
Sikhs' that are newly amved on the scene. While Parliament
promotes and consecrates one particular religious faith, there is
not a single constitutional document that underpins such basic
rights. It is, therefore, highly debatable whether there is a
constitution at all.
The question is particularly important because given the
absence of statutory protections for other religious faiths in
Britain, it is necessary to consider whether an answer is or can
be found in Britain's constitutional arrangements, particularly
since common law conceptions of fairness and justice have
made an impact not only in America but in former British
colonial territories from where the new immigrants came.81
These very people may, therefore, justifiably look to Britain's
constitutional principles for the protection of their religious
rights when they are in Britain.
The thesis that I am advancing here, however, is that an
examination of this constitutional arrangement leads us

81. See M.C. SETALRAD,
THE COMMONLAW IN INDIA (1969)(Hamlyn Lectures
by the Attorney General of India).
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precisely to the realization and conclusion that the way forward
in Britain was, most naturally, not in a new constitutional
settlement, but in the passing of a new Religious Freedom
Restoration Act such as the one passed most recently in the
United States, where after all, there was already a n existing
First Amendment Religious Clause in the Constitution which
alone was not effective enough to secure religious freedom for
all. In Britain, by contrast, there is not even an established
constitution because religious and political struggles
contributed in the seventeenth century to prevent the
formation of a written constitution in Britain.
To demonstrate these points, we need to first look a t the
nature of Britain's Constitution, where there is no protection of
religious liberties. Next, we will look at a series of highly
significant religious enactments that have shaped the character
of the state of Britain, but where the protection is solely for one
particular faith to the detriment of another, particularly the
Catholic faith. I will conclude that Sikh religious rights can be
most easily secured by the passing of one modern religious
enactment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which will
secure religious freedoms for all.
Traditionally, it is A.V. Dicey, Vinerian Professor of Law a t
Oxford University, who is thought to have defined the British
Constitution since there is no single document to which one can
refer for identifi~ation.'~Yet, a t the very time that he was
giving the preeminent exposition of the British Constitution,
which has been handed down ever since his Introduction to the
the
Study of the Law of the Constitution, written in 1~85,8~
very existence of a British Constitution was being questioned
by James Bryce. Bryce wrote that the distinguishing feature of
a constitution is that "[ilt is enacted not by the ordinary
legislative authority but by some higher and specially

82. Thus, Vernon Bogdanor, a leading constitutional expert in Britain, has
remarked that "Dicey is Britain's substitute for a codified constitution" and has
asked "[Ils there any other academic discipline still dominated by the work of an
author who wrote a hundred years ago?" See V. Bogdanor, Constitutional Law and
Politics, 7 OXFORDJ. OF LEGALSTUD.3 (1987).
83. Dicey said that the British system of government was characterized by
the Rule of Law, which he defined as "the absolute supremacy or predominance of
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, or even of wide
discretionary authority on the part of government. Englishmen are ruled by the
law, and by the law alone; a man may with us be punished for nothing else." AV.
DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION188,
202 (10th ed. 1965).
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empowered body. When any of its provisions conflict with a
provision of the ordinary law, it prevails and the ordinary law
must give way?
Bollingbroke said in 1773 that "b]y
Constitution we mean . . . that assemblage of laws, institutions
and customs derived fiom certain fixed principles of reasoning
. . . that compose the general system according to which the
community has agreed to be g~verned."~'Yet, Dicey's
perspective prevails today. In fact, it is said "that Dicey's word
has in some respects become the only written constitution that
[Britain has].
Dicey identified two principles underlying British
constitutional law: parliament supremacy and rule of law.87
Parliament supremacy means that Parliament can enact any
law, and the courts, in recognition of Parliament's legislative
monopoly, will be duty-bound to apply it. Similarly,
Parliament's authority exceeds that of the executive. The
House of Commons controls the executive branch and thereby
prevents the executive from acting in harsh and oppressive
ways. It is immediately apparent from the parliamentary
supremacy doctrine why Britain does not have a constitutional
court like the United States Supreme Court. Under this
doctrine, not only is there to be no written constitution but
there is to be no judicial guardianship of the constitution.
Consequently, Britain does not have judicial review of
legislative action, which is a major component of American
constitutional law. Parliament is supreme and what it enacts,
the courts must apply?

84. F.F. Ridley, There Is No British Constitution: A Dangerous Case Of The
AFF. 340, 343 (1988) (quoting James Bryce).
Emperor's Clothes, 41 PARLIAMENTARY
85. Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, in 2 R.IE WORKS OF LORD
BOLINGBROKE
88 (1841).
& OLIVER,
supm note 4, at v.
86. JOWELL
87. DICEY,
supm note 83, Chapter 13.
88. Dicey said:
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less
than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English
Constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and,
further that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.
Id. at 39-40. This principle was applied by the House of Lords in Pickin v. British
Railways Board, 1974 App. Cas. 765, and by the Privy Council of the House of
Lords in Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan, 1932 App. Cas. 526.
See earlier discussions, supm notes 26-27 and 30.
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Although British courts cannot question legislation, they
can still question the departments' and public officials'
discretionary mode of implementing the legislation. Here is
where Dicey's second principle, rule of law, comes into play.
Dicey disliked special rules and distinctive regimes. He
believed everyone should be subject to the ordinary law of the
realm as propounded by Parliament. Thus, he regarded every
act and every institution of the state as subject to the everabiding principle of the "rule of law," interpreted as the
prevalence of regular law over arbitrary and discretionary
power. The content of the "rule of law" remains a decidedly
limited one because only Parliament can review legislation, yet
the principle has resulted in judicial review of administrative
action, as courts evaluate how public officials have exercised
their discretion under parliamentary enactments. In this
judicial review of administrative acts, some of the most exciting
developments in the protection of basic rights have occurred.89
Ridley wrote in 1988, however, that judicial review of
administrative acts still did not give Britain a constitution, as
commonly understood, either written or unwritten. He based
his views on those of James Bryce. Ridley stated that "Britain
does not really have a constitution at all, merely a system of
government, even if some parts of it are more important to our
democratic order than others . . .
He borrowed from James
Bryce to say that "there is no test to discriminate between
constitutional and less than constitutional elements since
labelling has no defined consequence, unlike countries where
constitutions are a higher form of law.""
Ridley argued, based on James Bryce's views, that for a
constitution to be properly so-called "in the international sense
of the word," it must first establish a system of government so
that the system of government depends on the constitution and
is not independent from the Constitution. Second, it must set
sovereign authority outside the order it establishes, perhaps by
reference to "the people," as in America, thereby providing
legitimacy for law and the governmental system. Third, it must
operate as a form of law superior to other laws, thereby

89. See R. Gordon Q.C., The Awakened Conscience of the Nation, COUNSEL,
MarJApr. 1994, at 8 (arguing that the House of Lords has recently been acting
like a constitutional court).
90. RIDLEY,supra note 84, at 342.
91. Id. at 359.
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enabling judicial review of legislation by the courts. Lastly, i t
must be entrenched so that its status as an authority is safe
from political i n t e ~ e n t i o n . ~ ~
These characteristics are, of course, arguably missing from
the British Constitution. There is much talk in the common
law of fundamental rights and fundamental
but where
in the Constitution does it say what is fundamental and where
is the higher status ascribed to such alleged norms? Where,
indeed, is the Constitution if it is not simply a state of mind
emanating from the common law folklore of the constitutional
struggles of the seventeenth century?94Where in the British
Constitution is there a legal definition of government? What
~~
a
exists i s a framework of ~ o n v e n t i o n s . However,
conventional framework is far too loose and conventions are too
easily swept aside by a simple refusal to abide by them.96If
this is a system of government according to law, how can the
government be made to comply with fundamental law? In
short, does the British system comport with the notion of
constitutionalism-limited
government wherein power is
located in and checked by an organizational framework of
legislative, executive, and judicial functions, properly
apportioned by the Constitution itself, as is widely understood
from the written constitutions of the world's leading, modern
democracies-or is the British system quite simply one of
governmentalism where the state is, for all intents and
purposes, equated with the towering power of the government?
If Britain evinces the specter of the unconstitutional state,
why has modem Britain failed to adopt a written constitution?
This question is important from a religious rights point of view,
where there is a common misconception that since the state

92. Id. at 342-43.
93. Especially, see J.W. GOUGH,FUNDAMENTAL
LAW IN ENGLISHHISTORY
(1955).
94. Satvinder Juss, Silent Rights, NEW L. J., August 4, 1989, at 1069; see
also Satvinder Juss, Reason, Natural Justice and the Common Law, 14 LITIGATION
145-149 (NO.4, 1995).
95. G. ~~AFSHALL,CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS: THE RULESAND FORMSOF
POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
(1984).
96. Thus it is now clear that the convention of Ministerial Responsibility is
not being observed. See DIANA WOODHOUSE, MINISTERSAND PARLIAMENT:
ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE Chapters 3-6 (1994); Diana Woodhouse,
Ministerial Responsibility in the 1990s: When Do Ministers Reign?, 46
P A I U ~ ~ T AAFT.
R Y 277 (1993).
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has nothing to say about religion in a constitution that does not
exist, the state is neutral about such matters.
There are two reasons why Britain does not have a written
constitution. First, British history has been characterized by
stability. There have not been many upheavals. Normally,
countries adopt constitutions when they are about to make a
fresh start. Unlike other European countries, Britain has not
been invaded since the Norman Conquest of 1066 and has
remained a sovereign state since then. England has, in
consequence, not had to adopt a formal written constitution
upon gaining independence, unlike most states of the common
world. Its life has been characterized by a general inertia, by
insularity, and by pragmatism in its approach to the handling
of religious and political question^.^'
Second, while there was an opportunity for Britain to
formulate and establish a written constitution in the
seventeenth century at a time of great national strife and
instability, this opportunity did not materialize, as we shall
later see.98Yet, this period is critical to our understanding of
the quality of religious freedoms in Britain today because
religion was a central contention during the constitutional
struggles between Parliament and the Crown at this time, in
what became a defining moment for the British state.
The struggle was resolved in Parliament's favor, and
subsequently not only did Britain have a constitutional
monarchy, but that monarchy was required to protect and
safeguard the Protestant faith as the state religion. The result
is that Britain's official faith is its essential identifying
hallmark. Clearly, therefore, the fact that there is no religious
preference stated or secured in a written constitution does not
mean, in this case, that the state is neutral about its religious
orientation.
Inevitably then, state policies are directed towards that
orientation." Other religions, like the Sikh religion, will never
fare as well in this climate of officially sanctioned forms of
state preference and discrimination of religious faiths.'"
97. The classic work to note here is SIR KENNETH WHEARE, MODERN
C o ~ s m o (2d
~ sed. 1966).
98. See infra part 1II.B.
99. A recent example of this has been the making of Christianity a
compulsory part of the state school system. See s u p m note 15.
100. See infra part 1II.C. discussing disabilities .for other religious
denominations.
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What has to be recognized in any religious freedoms debate in
Britain is that without the preservation of its faith as its
central attribute, England is not England. The English state
has been defined by its religion.
A more complete case for passing a Religious Freedom
Restoration Act that would assist the Sikhs in Britain to attain
fuller expression of their faith can be made by looking at the
historical development of English identity with faith and the
Constitution that evolved from it. This is an especially useful
exercise because we find that whereas England was unique in
defining important questions of the state early (thus defining
itself, for the state, long before written constitutions became
fashionable elsewhere), in the process it "restored" to itself
religious freedoms that i t felt it was losing through
encroachment from the outside. Britain clearly needs to restore
these freedoms again in the context of its present multicultural society.
I will therefore evaluate, by running through the salient
features of the seventeenth century struggles, the historical
development of English identity through faith and the
constitution that evolved from it. I do so especially because
constitutional history is much neglected in British law schools
today and thus, this analysis may be useful to British readers
as well as others. In the seventeenth century struggle, the
Stuart kings staked their claim to rule autocratically as the
appointees of God-a situation carrying fundamental religious
implications in itself, but especially if that God turned out to be
someone else's God. Oliver Cromwell squashed this claim by
defeating the Royalists i n battle, but began ruling
autocratically himself when he was appointed Lord Protector.
Disillusioned, Parliament summoned the King back again, and
"restored" his position as monarch of the realm. Then, through
a series of enactments-the Convention Parliament Act, the
Coronation Oath Act, the Bill of Rights, and the Crown and
Parliament Recognition Act which were passed in 1688 to
1689-Parliament
constitutionalized the position of the
monarch as the protector of the state religion. This process was
consecrated fully in the Act of Settlement of 1700 and extended
to Scotland in the Union of Scotland Act of 1706. Through this
process, which has never been reversed, Parliament
disadvantaged other religious faiths. The passage of a Religious
Freedom Restoration Act would reinstate equality of treatment
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for other faiths such as the Sikhs. But the process must first be
explained.
The seventeenth century s t ~ g g l e s ' ~ 'are the most
important period of political and religious upheaval in British
history. As a result of these struggles, kings and queens lost
their crowns, and some even their heads. We see the
unmistakable link between politics and religion early in this
struggle with the overbearing Charles I and the concomitant
rise of the puritans.lo2 For both, politics and religion were
indistinguishable. In describing this struggle, I look first at the
English Civil War and then a t the Glorious Revolution, and
then make out a case for Disestablishment that would pave the
way for a Religious Freedom Restoration Act and would serve
to protect the rights of all religions.

A. The English Civil War (1642-1648)lo3
Charles I, who assumed the English throne in 1625, like
his father James I, who ruled between 1605 and 1625, believed
the "divine right of Kings" to mean that he was only answerable to God, not to Parliament.lo4 Three times between 1625
and 1628, Charles tried to raise money by taxation without the
consent of Parliament; each time Parliament objected and each
time Charles dissolved the assembly. Charles then summoned
Parliament in 1640 after he realized that even the illegal taxes
he was collecting were insufficient. Opposition to Charles had
become implacable, however. An important element in this
opposition were the Puritans, so-called because they wanted to
purify the Church of England. They wanted a simpler prayer
book. They also wanted to do away with bishops. They believed
in the power of individual faith, and they did not believe in the
divine right of kings. They particularly opposed Charles I be101. M. JUDSON,THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1949).
102. Dominic Grant writes that %]he constitutional crisis of the seventeenth
century was religious as well as political." However, most law students are not told
this. See Dominic Grant, By Law Established: The Church of England and its
S'TUDIES 168, 175 (R. Blackburn ed.,
Place in the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL
1992).
103. For background reading, see C.V. WEDGWOOD,
THE KING'S PEACE,16371641 (1955); B.H.G. WORMALD,
CLARENDON:
POLITICS, HISTORY,
RELIGION
(1951).
For the Civil War period, see C.V. W E D G W ~THE
D , KING'S WAR,1641-1647 (1958).
However, the best indepth analysis of this period remains the ten volume work
OF ENGLAND, 1603-1642 (1883-4). See also its four volume
S.R. GARDNER,
HISTORY
THE HISTORY
OF THE GREATCIVIL WAR, 1642-1649 (1893).
sequel, S.R. GARDNER,
RIE STUARTS
(1958).
104. A highly readable account is found in J.P. KENYON,

510

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

cause his wife Henrietta Maria was Catholic and they strongly
suspected the king of favoring Catholicism. Law, religion, and
politics were plainly and inextricably intertwined in this struggle, and any solution had to be a resolution of, not one, but all
three of these issues.
Led by Cromwell the Puritan,lo5Parliament went to war
in 1642, with its famous battles of Edgehill (1642), Marston
Moor (1644) and Naseby (1645), and culminating in Charles I's
defeat in 1648 and his trial for tyranny before a court at Westminster. On January 30, 1649, Charles I was executed.
Subsequently, Cromwell set out to establish a republic.
This may in time have provided an answer to the problems of
religious toleration and constitutional government. Cromwell's
rule was not popular however, because like the king, he ruled
autocratically, not in the name of democracy, but in the name
of God. During Cromwell's reign, Charles 1's son was crowned
as Charles I1 in Scotland.'06 In 1660, two years after
Cromwell's death, Parliament invited Charles I1 to take the
throne. The old order was reinstated. Charles I1 did not control
taxation like his father, but he still appointed all the ministers
and he still controlled the army. Little had changed.
An opportunity to adopt a written constitution evaporated
as Cromwell's Instrument of Government of 1653 was discarded
as the revolution fizzled out. This prevented the development of
a system of proper constitutional government in Britain. The
Instrument of Government was a genuine written constitution
intended by Cromwell to be the basis of his republican form of
government. No British schoolboy troubles himself to learn of it
now. But, it was later to become very influential in the North
American Colonies' struggle for independence fkom the Crown
as they set themselves on the road to becoming the most constitutional state on earth.

B. The Glorious Revolution (1688)lo7
From the perspective of English constitutionalism and
religious liberty, the first bloody revolution was much less
significant than the second more peaceful revolution of the
105.
ment is
106.
107.
(1955).

The best examination of Puritanism as a religious and intellectual moveE.W. HldLER, THE RISE OF PURITANISM(1938).
See D. OGG, ENGLANDIN THE REIGN OF CHARLESI1 (2d ed. 1955).
See D. OGG, ENGLAND IN THE REIGNS OF JAMES 11 AND WILLIAM
111
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seventeenth century. This was the Glorious Revolution of 1688,
the revolution that defined Englishness, English nationalism
and the character of the English state. This event precluded
the recognition of religious diversity in Britain. Charles I1 was
succeeded by his son James I1 in 1685,'" but James ruled only three years before being deposed in 1688 because he favored
Roman Catholics. Fearful of James' Catholic bias, Parliament
invited the Protestant ruler of the Netherlands, William of
Orange, who had married Mary in 1677, the Protestant daughter of James 11, to invade England. He landed at Torbay with
an army drawn from the low countries and from Protestant
Europe on November 5, 1688. The Protestant link is obvious. In
December 1688 James I1 fled to France, William and Mary
gave terms on which they were accepted as King and Queen by
Parliament and these terms are laid out in a series of statutes.log It is important to note here that these statutes are
the leading statutes of English constitutional law, and that if
there was a specific right to religious freedom in the British
Constitution for such groups as the Sikhs, the discriminatory
and offending parts of these statutory provisions would today
be subject to repeal. These aspects of the statutes may now be
considered.
1. Convention Parliament Act (1688)
Chapter I

1 William & Mary

For Parliament, the most important matter was that there
should never again be any question mark raised about its right
to assemble and sit as Parliament. The first thing William and
Mary had to agree to was to "An Act for Removing and Preventing all Questions and 'Disputes' Concerning the Assembling and Sitting of this Parlyament." Passed on January 22,
1688, the Act declared that there be two Houses of Parliament.
No religious issue was involved, and thus, there is no discriminatory or offending position here. However, even though not
controversial, this statute is hardly known to law students in
England.

108. The best biography on James I1 is F.C. TUXNER, JAMESI1 (1949).
109. The series of statutes are laid out in the subsequent discussion. Despite
OF ENGLAND
its Whig bias, a good account of this period is MACAULAY, HISTORY
(Sir Charles Firth ed., 1913-15).
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2. The Coronation Oath Act (1688) 2 William & Mary Chapter 6
A second statutory enactment by Parliament focused on
the King and Queen and how they were to conduct themselves
in preserving the realm. The Coronation Act was "An Act for
Establishing the Coronation Oath" whereby the King was required on assuming the throne to "solemnley promise and
sweare to governe the people of this Kingdome . . . according to
the statutes in Parlyament agreed on and the laws and customs
of the same" and required to "maintaine the laws of God the
true profession of the Gospel1 and the Protestant reformed religion established by law" and required to "preserve unto the
bishops and clergy of this realme and to the churches committed to their charge all such rights and privileges." Under this
statute Parliament has made the Crown the protector of one
faith only, which faith the Crown must maintain with strict
accordance to its true principles and whose churches and spiritual leaders the Crown must also preserve. This is discriminatory because it lends state sanction to one faith only. Sikh
leaders cannot turn to the Crown, or for that matter to Parliament, to ask for similar protections under this statute.
3. The Bill of Rights (1689) 1 William & Mary Session 2
Chapter 2

The most important statute of this period is however, the
Bill of Rights. In the Bill of Rights of 1689 (which is unlike the
bill of rights of any other country and which, again, no schoolboy troubles himself unduly over), Parliament for the first time
forbade the succession of Roman Catholics to the throne and
the monarch's marriage to a Roman Catholic. There is an undoubted hostility here to another religious faith which under a
modem system of government would be considered unnecessary
and unconstitutional. The Bill charged that "James the second
. . . did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the lawes and liberties of this Kingdome." He did so,
inter alia, "[bly causing several good subjects being Protestants
to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed
and imployed contrary to the law."
This Act is worth quoting extensively because of its implacable hostility to the Catholic Church. It is significant more
today because it detracts from a principle of religious diversity
and tolerance which we expect to be the hallmark of contempo-
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rary liberal democracies, and which ironically, is a principle
that many people generally believe can be easily obsemed in
Britain today. Given that this is so, a statute such as this is
harmful to the aspirations of a multi-cultural society and harmful to the interests of a mature democracy and should be
amended. Parliament need only pass a Religious Freedom Restoration Act to do this.'1°
The Bill dictated that "the two Houses of Parlyament
should continue to sitt and with their Majesties royal1 concurrence make effectual1 provision for the settlement of the religion lawes and liberties of this Kingdome soe that the same for
the future might not be in danger againe of being subverted . . . .""' To this end, it concluded that
whereas it hath beene found by experience that it is inconsistent with the safety and welfaire of this protestant Kingdome
to be governed by a popish prince or by any King or Queene
marrying a papist the said lords spiritual1 and temporal1 and
commons doe further pray that it may be enacted that all and
every person and persons that is or are shall be reconciled to
or shall hold communion with the see or church of Rome or
shall professe the popish religion or shall marry a papist shall
be excluded and be forever uncapable to inherit possesse or
enjoy the crowne and government of this realme . . .2I'.

Not trusting the King any longer to not "subvert and extirpate
the Protestant religion and the lawes and liberties of this
Kingdome," Parliament also made it illegal for a monarch to
suspend laws, to keep an army in peacetime or to impose taxes
of his own v~lition."~
The effect of this law was far-reaching
in that Parliament and the legislative process was manifestly
committed henceforward to the protection of religious freedom,
but because this form of protection had evolved in a way that
was reactive rather than proactive, Parliament had only given
protection to the Protestant faith (against the Catholic faith)
and not to all other faiths as well. In its determination to uphold the right to its faith, Parliament utilized the office of the
crown in the circumstances.

110.
111.
112.
113.

See supra pp. 6-8.
1 W. & M. sess 2 ch. 2 9 1 (1688).
Id.
Id.
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4. Crown and Parliament Recognition Act (1689) 2 William
& Mary Chapter 1

To place this palpable transfer of power from monarchy to
Parliament beyond question, the Crown and Parliament Recognition Act was passed in 1689, which was "An Act for
Recognising King William and Queene Mary and for avoiding
all Questions touching the Acts made in the Parliament at Westminster the thirteenth day of February one thousand six hundred and eighty eight."ll4 This Act emphasized that "all and
singular the acts made and enacted in the said Parlyament
were and are statutes of this Kingdome and as such ought to be
reputed taken and obeyed by all the people of this
Kingd~me.""~Not even British law students must learn
about the significance of this Act. Yet, thus was the constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty solidified in Britain and by this doctrine Parliament alone obtained the authority to legislate on religious liberty matters. Remarkably,
notwithstanding Britain's earlier experience in legislating on
these issues during this period, this is an authority that it has
in modern times scarcely exercised on religious liberty issues.
So traumatic it seems has been the experience of the seventeenth century upheavals that legislative initiative in the matter of religious freedoms is not easily countenanced by the
British Parliament, particularly where such an initiative has
the effect of enfranchising the religious rights of new religious
groups such as the Sikhs. Instead, protection for such groups
takes the form of other non-discriminatory statutory enactments, which are manifestly unsuited, as we shall see.
The Bill of Rights of 1688 contains the first sanction of
hostility to the Catholic Church in Britain's constitutional arrangements, although Catholics were banned from sitting in
either House of Parliament in 1678. The Bill of Rights also
inaugurated the establishment of a religion of the state, by the
state, for the state, in the form of the Protestant faith. As such,
the Bill of Rights augured badly for the quality of religious
freedom in Britain today. That deficient quality continues to
this day and affects the religious rights of Sikhs and other new
groups in Britain. Within, the Bill of Rights's establishment
provisions were the inevitable product of England's constitu-

114. Id.
115. Id.
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tional struggles. Without, Protestant establishment was encouraged by England's sustained opposition to Catholic Spain,
France and Ireland, which opposition was at its height at the
time the Bill of Rights was enacted.

5. The Act of Settlement (1700) 12 & 13 William 3 Chapter 2
The process of Protestant establishment continued in the
next incumbent of the throne when twelve years later Princess
Sophia, Electress and Duchess dowager of Hanover, succeeded
to the monarchy. The Act of Settlement 1700 was passed as
"An Act for the Limitation of the crown and better securing the
rights and liberties of the subje~t.""~The Act acknowledged
her succession "in the protestant line to the imperiall
crown"117and emphasized "that every King and Queen of this
realm who shall come to and succeed in the imperiall crown of
this Kingdom by virtue of this Act shall have the coronation
oath administered to him or her at their respective coronations . . . ."'" The supreme importance of the Coronation
Oath cannot be overemphasized, for it established a symbiotic
link between the monarch and the established church which
the monarch and all those in line to the throne were dutybound to uphold. Thus, as the crown became a constitutional
monarchy, the protection of the established church became a
raison-d'Etre of that monarchy.
6. Union with Scotland Acts (1 706) 6 Anne Chapter 11
Consolidation of this process continued into the reign of the
last Stuart monarch, Queen Anne, who reigned from 17021714, when the established church was extended to Scotland.
The core of Britain's constitutional relationship between
church, state and people was established in the Union of Scotland Act of 1706 which was passed when England entered into
a union with the independent State of Scotland. The two parliaments were merged into a new Parliament of the United
Kingdom when they both passed separate Union with Scotland
Acts ratifying the Treaty of Union that had been negotiated
between the two kingdoms to make it into one. One Act was
passed in London, the other in Edinburgh, to unite Scotland

116. 12 & 13 Will. 3 ch. 2 (1700).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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with England. Curiously, though adopted in a system of government where Parliament was always free to amend or abolish prior laws, the Act of Union with Scotland, passed in London, bears all the hallmarks of a fundamental law or constitution, for it declares that "this Act of Parliament . . . shall be
held and observed in all time coming as a fundamental and
essential condition of any treaty or union to be concluded betwixt the two kingdoms without any alteration thereof or derogation thereto in any sort f~rever.""~It also states that "all
laws and statutes in this Kingdom so far they are contrary to
or inconsistent with the terms of these articles . . . shall from
and after the union cease and become void."'20 The Act further provides "for establishing the Protestant religion and
Presbyterian Church government within the Kingdom of Scotland" and makes similar provisions for England. The Act prohibits "any alteration of the worship, discipline and government
of the Church of this Kingdom as now by law established" and
requires that "the worship discipline and government of this
Church should be effectually and unalterably secured . . . ."I2'
One modern writer has explained that the Union with Scotland
Acts, designed to merge the two Parliaments, "provided a rudimentary framework of a written con~titution."'~~
Yet, whether the Acts established a framework in which
Britain could develop a written constitution or not, the acts did
nothing to promote the religious freedom that is required in the
modern pluralist state; indeed, the acts entrenched the religious establishment of Protestantism. They have been positively harmful to the cause of religious fieedom because they are
simply deemed to be fundamental to the existence of the United Kingdom as constituent Acts and as such, taking priority
over the other statutes. The perception of their fundamentality
is not something that need detain legislators today, however,
and I have a t the outset shown that the constitutional obstacles
in disregarding these Acts are not insurmountable.'" What is
necessary today is legislation that promotes the objectives of
religious pluralism.

119.
120.
121.
122.
(7th ed.
123.

Union with Scotland Acts, 6 Anne ch. 11 (1706).
Id.
Id.
S. DE SMlTH & R. BRAZIER,CONSTITUTIONAL& ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9
1994).
See supra pp. 6-8.
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C. A Case for Disestablishment
The foregoing analysis has attempted to provide a sketch of
the salient features of Britain's religious history. This history
has determined, and continues to determine to this day,
Britain's response to the questions of religious liberty. There is
a marked absence of legislative initiatives taken to help other
religious groups, or even to recognize the existence of other
religious groups. Thus, whereas it may be said that Britain has
placed a high premium on the right of its inhabitants to observe the Protestant faith without any fear whatsoever, it cannot be said that it has demonstrated the same commitment to
the observance of other faiths by other peoples. Whatever may
have been the exigencies of the moment in the seventeenth
century, the situation in the modern era, has produced a profound imbalance in the Constitution.
Originally, this imbalance became most readily visible with
the Roman Catholics. It is true that the ban on Roman Catholics entering Parliament was lified in the nineteenth century,
but this only happened after the conversion to Rome of John
Henry Newman, a Protestant priest, who in 1833 launched the
Ractarian (Anglo-Catholic) movement and made English Catholicism respectable again. It is also true that Roman Catholics were henceforward allowed to vote at elections and were
eligible for state offices. Yet only in 1974 was it made clear
that an adherent of the Roman Catholic faith could stand for
the Lord Chancellorship.'" This demonstrates that the ties
between the church and the state continue to the present day.
These ties affect the religious liberty of the individual in Britain and they are not compatible with the concept of the individual in the modern state.'25
The requirement that the sovereign be a Protestant is not
just a limit 'on the liberties of those who may succeed to the
throne. This requirement also implies that the sovereign should
be a Christian and represent an ideal. This offends not only
religious minorities who are not Christian but also most Christians who do not aspire to a Christian ideal. The non-Christian
religious groups see in this imposed ideal not just a country
124. Lord Chancellor (Tenure of Office and Discharge of Ecclesiastical Functions) Act 1974, 8 1 (1974).
(London),
125. See Joan Bakewell, Search for the Secular Soul, THE GUARDIAN
November 26, 1993 at 24; Walter Schwarz, Church Has Failed in the Marketplace,
THE GUARDIAN
(London), December 13, 1993, at 4.
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that is Christian in its attitudes, but Christian in its moral
aspirations, which aspirations the non-Christians may not
share.
Yet their own faith, by which they strive to live in these
difficult circumstances, does not have the sanction of the state
as does the imposed value system of the Protestant Christian
faith. The sovereign takes a special interest in that established
faith, but he takes none in other faiths. Thus, the sovereign
must approve by law the Church's choice of bishops, twenty-six
of which may then automatically be members of the upper
House of Parliament,126 the House of Lords, and no such
right exists for senior members of other faiths. Unsurprisingly,
advocates of constitutional reform argue that in a reformed
Parliament, the major religions of the country may well be
given a similar voice in the second chamber.
The chilling effect of the established Church of England on
those not of the established faith seeps vertically downward
into the lower echelons of society in even more practical ways.
Thus, every person in a parish (the traditional unit of civil
government for such purposes as poor law administration; each
parish has its own church and clergyman) and not just the
signed members of the Church of England, has the right to ask
for the services of the parish church. Furthermore, the state
has the right to appoint financial officers to supervise the endowments of the Church of England. No such rights exist for
other faiths. This was far more significant in the days before
the Second World War. The system of poor law related to the
public (compulsory) relief of the indigent poor. By the Poor
Relief Act of 1601, overseers of the poor were appointed in
every parish to provide for the relief of paupers settled there,
and to levy a rate on property therein. Although the National
Assistance Act of 1948 transferred to the state many responsibilities, even today, the state can appoint officers to manage
the churches' resources in these circumstances. In the same
way, the state funds the Church of England's state schools.
Muslims and Sikhs have applied for their schools to be so supported, but there is currently not a single such school. In 1920,
the Anglican Church in Wales was disestablished because of
the sheer strength of nonconformist churches in Wales which

---

-

-

-

126. Grant, supra note 102, at 169.
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led to the Welsh Church Act of 1914. In the next few years,
similar pressures may force a change in England as well.la7

Having, in the preceding two sections, described the Sikhs
and their religious beliefs, as well as the distinctive characteristics of evolving British religious and constitutional history, we
must now consider the device that Britain adopted to protect
the religious rights of Sikhs who arrived in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. A new religious faith such as Sikhism was not
going to be assimilated easily into Britain's complex historical
arrangement. Sikhs suffered discrimination, but what was
noteworthy about this discrimination in relation to that suffered by other minority groups newly amved in Britain was
that it was preeminently religious. There was discrimination in
jobs, and still is.
Many Sikhs cannot not find employment in Britain unless
they first remove their turbans and shave their hair. Brown
writes that "more than one Sikh, when told that a job was
taken, has returned home, shaved, and successfully re-applied
for the same job."la8 In 1964, a London Transport guard was
suspended fkom work for forty days because, after obtaining his
job, he grew his hair again and wore his turban. Many also
discarded their Kirpan for fear of offending British laws. In the
late 1960s a famous dispute arose between male Sikh bus employees and the Wolverhampton Council over the right of Sikhs
to wear turbans rather than peaked caps. The Sikh busmen
eventually won the dispute in April 1969 after a two-year battle and were allowed to wear their turbans. In December 1969,
the Race Relations Board (RRB), established under the 1965
Act, found Wolverhampton Council to be guilty of racial discrimination.
Yet, the discrimination had plainly been religious and not
racial since unturbaned, clean-shaven Sikhs were readily able
to gain employment with the council. The discrimination was

127. This pressure became most evident in the wake of the Satanic Verses affair, when Muslims in Britain were unable to successfully bring blasphemy actions
in the courts against Salman Rushdie. See R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate ez parte Choudhury, 1 All E.R. 306, 318 (1991) (Watkins, L.J.). For an
excellent account of this, see also A. Bradney, Taking Sides: Religion, Law and
Politics, NEWL.J., March 26, 1993, at 434, 443.
128. J. BROWN,
THE UNMELTING
POT 116 (1969).
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treated as racial, because no other potentially applicable category existed in the law of racial discrimination, which was the
device that Britain used to tackle the problems of all minorities
living in Britain. No affirmation of the right to religious
freedom exists in British law, save in respect to the established
Church of England. Yet, to wrongly categorize discrimination
as racial when it is in fact religious, can cause more harm than
good.
In this section, therefore, I will develop the theme of the
insufficiency and unpredictability of British law in protecting
religious freedoms, which makes the case for a detailed and
specific religious freedom legislation compelling and unavoidable. I will do this by noting first the inadequacy of the common law; second, the inadequacy of each of the three Race
Relations Acts passed by Parliament to curb religious discrimination; third, the way in which Parliament consciously decided
not to include a religious fkeedom category in the legislation;
fourth, I will consider the leading case under this legislation to
date, namely, the Mandla decision and the meaning of "ethnic
origins" given to it by the House of Lords; and finally, I will
bolster the case for a Religious Freedom Act by looking a t the
threat posed by generally applicable laws.

A. The Inadequacy of the Common Law
British politicians saw immigration and race relations "as
emotional, irrational and intractable matters, not amenable to
the reason, negotiation and compromise which characterized
economical and class issues."129 Consequently, they wished
"to avoid or suppress"130such issues instead of confront them.
As politicians avoided immigration and race relations issues,
the inadequacy of the common law as an instrument of social
justice became apparent. The common law was the law of freedom; it allowed the individual, subject to the restrictions of
criminal law, to act as he or she would. Thus, under the common law, an individual was .free to discriminate. As Lord Simon said in the House of Commons, "The Common law before
the making of the first Race Relations Act (1965) was that
people could discriminate against others on the ground of
colour, etc . . . to their heart's content. This unbridled capacity

129. Z. LAYTON-HENRY,
THE POLITICS
OF RACE IN BRITAINxiv (1984).
130. Id.
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to discriminate was the mischief and defect for which Common
law did not provide."131 Because the common law did not bar
discrimination, it was left to Parliament to confront the discrimination problem.

B. The Inadequacy of the Race Relations Legislation
1. The Race Relations Act (1965)

In 1965, Parliament enacted the first Race Relations Act
which outlawed discrimination in certain places of public resort, such as dance halls and public houses, and in the disposal
of tenancies where there was much discrimination by landlords,
and created the offence of incitement to racial hatred. It also
established the Race Relations Board (RRB) to operate conciliation procedures in the form of conciliation committees, with
resort to the Attorney General to bring the case to court as a
Yet the Act did not go far enough. It did not
final 0pti0n.l~~
prohibit discrimination based on religion.

2. The Race Relations Act (1968)
In 1968 the second Race Relations Act was passed, expanding the prohibition against discrimination to the provision of
goods, facilities and services as well as employment, housing
However, the legislation was still defecand ad~ertising.'~~
tive. Only discrimination based on color, race, or ethnic or national origins was prohibited. Discrimination based on religion
was not proscribed. The RRB was empowered to take cases to
court if conciliation failed, instead of taking them to the Attorney General. A Community Relations Committee (CRC) was
also established to promote good race relations. This second Act
was much influenced by U.S. race legislation and was passed
partly because of the violent riots in Watts in Los Angeles and
the other American cities in the mid-1960s. The limitations of
this second Act became apparent when in the 1972 Zeskol%

131. Applin v. Race Relations Board, 1975 App. Cas. 259, 286 (Lord Simon).
132. Discrimination "in places of public resort" was defined in Section 1 and
"in the disposal of tenancies" in Section 5. The prohibition of incitement to racial
hatred is found in Section 6. Section 2 of the Act established the Race Relations
Board and Conciliation Committees, while proceedings for enforcement by the Attorney General were laid out in Section 3. The entire Act only had eight sections
with a total length of five pages.
133. Race Relations Act, 1968, ch. 71.
134. London Borough of Ealing v. Race Relations Board, 1972 App. Cas. 342.
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case, the House of Lords considered the meaning of the phrase
"national origins" in a situation where a Housing Authority had
refused to put a person of Polish nationality on the council's
housing waiting list because he was not, as their rules required, a British subject.
The House of Lords held that the Race Relations Act had
not been infringed because discrimination based upon nationality was not discrimination based on "national origins." Lord
Simon declared that "the Acts of 1965 and 1968 do not provide
a complete code against discrimination or socially divisive propaganda. The Acts do not deal at all with discrimination on
grounds of religion or political tenet."135 Even Lord Cross,
who recognized that "[tlhere is no definition of 'national origins'
in the Act and one must interpret the phrase as best one can,"
interpreted "national origins" in such a way as to reach the
same result as his brethren.136 Even within its own limited
terms, therefore, the relief provided by the Act was not reliable
relief. It had surely been open to their Lordships to have construed "national origins" more liberally with parliamentary intention clearly in mind, than to construe it as narrowly as they
did.
3. The Race Relations Act (1976)
This is the third and current race relations statute in Britain. Under the 1976 Act, the Race Relations Board was replaced by the Commission for Racial Equality, and the limitations of "national origins," made so apparent in the Zesko
case, were corrected by proscribing discrimination based on
nationality as well. The Act thus prohibited discrimination due
to "colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins."13'
The Act remains a race relations act, however, banning discrimination, whether direct or indirect, only on racial grounds.
The Act contains no prohibition against discrimination on religious grounds. Thus, to the extent the Act remains similar to
the 1968 Act, the judgements of their Lordships in the Zesko
case are still relevant today.

135. Id. at 362-3.
136. Id. at 365-6.
137. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74.
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C. The Threat from Facially Neutral and Generally Applicable Laws
Laws exist for the people. People do not exist for the law.
Laws should make exceptions for the people. People should not
have to make exceptions for the law. For laws should only be
an instrument for the better living of mankind. In my final
section, I argue that law must protect human rights as its
fundamental purpose. If it does not do this it will become oppressive. Generally applicable laws that are not specifically
targeted at individuals in the practice of their faith may become oppressive for an individual if it restricts him or her from
living according to his or her beliefs. The international community is increasingly calling upon religious faiths to recognize
and respect human rights. Religion should be about the expression of individuality and about individual self-fulfillment. If, to
that end, faiths have to be democratized, then they have to be
democratized to keep up with the times.
Yet, by the same token, a state cannot ask this of a faith if
it is in violation of human rights itself, whether inadvertently
or not. If a religious faith must devise and imbue itself with a
theory of human rights, then so must the state. Unless and
until a Religious Freedom Act is passed, exempting the application of generally applicable laws to the Sikhs, the state in Britain will remain in infringement of the basic human rights of
religious expression.ls8 Broadly, I will consider here, by way
of example, two generally applicable laws which have
threatened Sikhs. One is the threat posed by the requirement
to wear crash helmets when riding motor-cycles; the other is
the requirement to wear hard hats when working in a dangerous environment. One was a domestic threat posed by British
laws which Sikhs eventually won; the other is a European
Community law threat which shows, as yet, no signs of abating
for the Sikhs.
In 1972, the British government passed the Road Traffic
Act, Section 32 of which required any person riding a motorcy-

138. It has not been the purpose of this paper to consider the basic human
rights laws on religious freedoms, but reference may be made to such important
international instruments as: Article 18 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights:
Articles 18, 20 a d 27 of The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights 1966; the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
1965; and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.
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cle to wear a crash helmet.lsg No exemptions were provided.
Sikhs affected by this well-intentioned legislation saw it as an
assault on their religious beliefs, since wearing any headgear
other than the turban defiles their uncut hair. Under the direction of the Sikh temples, the Sikhs organized a protest. The
route they chose was renowned for its success. They chose
passive protest, courting arrest. Sikhs rode on motorcycles and
scooters without crash-helmets and paid the penalty prescribed
by law. Though lacking a supreme court in which to have this
legislation reviewed, the Sikhs were able to take their protest
to Parliament where Sidney Bidwell M.P. advocated their
cause, arguing, as did the Sikhs, that if it was acceptable for
the Sikhs to fight for the British Empire and again for Britain
in two World Wars, far more perilous situations, wearing their
turbans and not steel helmets, it should surely be acceptable
for them to wear turbans when riding bikes. After three years,
the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemptions) Act 1976
was finally passed, Section 1 of which amended Section 32 of
the original Act to read: "A requirement imposed by regulations
under this section (whenever made) shall not apply to any
follower of the Sikh Religion while he is wearing a turban."'*
Such a dispensation is, unfortunately, still awaited by
Sikhs who work on building sites. In this area, the threat has
come from Europe with its European Convention on Human
Rights, which recognizes the right to religious freedom in Article 19 (akin to a written constitution and the closest document
Britain has to such), and its Court at Strasbourg (akin to a
constitutional court). Ironically, the legislation is once again
well-intentioned. The legislation, laid down by the European
Council, sets minimum requirements for personal protective
equipment at work. Included is a requirement that everyone on
nonconstruction sites wear helmets. The British government, in
sections 11 and 12 of the Employment Act of 1989 provided
exemptions for Sikhs from the construction helmets mandate.
The EC Directive, however, forced Britain to require, in its Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations of 1992, the
wearing of helmets in non-construction sites.14'

139. Road TraEc Act, 1988, ch. 52 8 16 (1988).
140. For a full account, see SM)NEY BIDWELL MP., THE TURBAN VICTORY(2d
ed. 1987).
141. The regulations were necessary to implement six European Community directives on health and safety at work. They were also part of a continuing modern-

SIKHS IN BRITAIN
The British Sikh community is seeking exemption on nonconstruction areas, where the risk of injury is obviously lower
than construction areas. Conferences have been ordered by city
Sikh T e m ~ 1 e s . lThe
~ ~ concern is not just over the impact of
the new safety rules on the wearing of the Sikh turban, but
over reduced chances of promotion, job losses, and even limited
career choices for those who refuse to comply with the new
rules. Despite these concerns, the regulations went into effect
on January 1, 1993. This example clearly illustrates the need
for specific religious freedom legislation. In fact, it is now abundantly clear that even Mandla does not provide protection for
the Sikhs.143

D. The Absence of a Specific Religious Freedom Category
The foregoing analysis begs the question, why was a specific religious freedom category not included in the Act? This is
especially so given that some categories that do exist in the act,
such as color and national origins, have no necessary natural
affinity with each other. In fact, it would have been no difficult
matter to have inserted a religious clause as well. At least that
would have had the merit of ascribing to the Act some consistency or integrity of purpose.14
Lord Templeman, in the Mandla case discussed below,
supposed that Parliament chose not to include religious discrimination in the Race Relations Act because Parliament "considered that the amount of discrimination on religious grounds
does not constitute a severe burden on members of religious
groups."" Yet, it is clear from this essay that religious dis-

ization of existing United Kingdom law. The EC directives themselves formed part
of a program of action on health and safety in the move towards a single European market. They had been developed under Article 118A which was specially added
to the Treaty of Rome for this purpose.
142. Over 500 delegates attended, from Sikh temples in London, Birmingham,
Bedford, Luton, Leeds, Bristol, Cardiff, Leicester and Maidenhead, a British Sikh
Federation Conference in Slough on November 29, 1992 to discuss this matter. Also
City Councillor Piara Singh of Leicester has spoken out. See Vasant Kalyani &
Deepa Pathi, Sikh Job Fear Over EC Rules: Government Action Call Over Rules,
LEICESTER MERCURY,
November 3, 1992, a t 1.
143. Mandla is the leading case on Sikh religious rights and is discussed infia
part 1V.E.
144. For instance, in many international instruments on discrimination, racial
and religious discrimination go hand in hand.
145. Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548, 568 (Lord Templeman).
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crimination does severely burden members of religious groups
today.
An unsuccessful attempt had been made in Parliament to
prohibit religious discrimination in the 1976 Act but the government argued that issues peculiar to religion would arise and
that religious discrimination should be addressed in a separate
bill.'& No separate religious discrimination bill has ever been
passed, however.

E. Mandla and "Ethnic Origins"
The inadequacy of the current race relations legislation, in
the absence of a special religious freedom law, to protect rights
that are not racial but quintessentially religious, became strikingly apparent in what is generally regarded as the most important case on religious freedom in modern Britain: the
Mandla case.14' It demonstrates that the "ethnic origins"
category, although the most elastic in the race relations legislation, is in the long-term, ill-suited to protecting religious freedoms because race is an element of ethnicity and thus, only a
few minority religions will qualify as races, even though the
Sikhs did in this case.
In Mandla, the Commission for Racial Equality brought
proceedings against the headmaster of a private school for
refusing admission to a Sikh boy, Mandla, who, contrary to
school rules, would have had to wear a turban. The case was
based on the new Race Relations Act 1976. The Mandla case
could, legally, only be dealt with under race relations legislation. The inappropriateness of this became plain as the headmaster of the school argued that he had not meant to discriminate on racial grounds. His school had 300 pupils
of whom over 200 were English, five were Sikhs, 34 Hindus,
16 Persians, six Negroes, seven Chinese and 15 from European countries. The reasons for having a school uniform were
largely reasons of practical convenience-to minimize external
differences between races and social classes, to discourage the
"competitive fashions" which he said tend to exist in a teenage community, and present a Christian image of the school
to

146. See HOUSE OF COMMONS,STANDINGCOMMITTEEA, April 29, 1976 and
May 4, 1976, a t cols. 84118.
147. Mandla [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548.
148. Id. at 566 (Lord Fraser).
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The High Court upheld the boy's right to be admitted to the
school. The Court of Appeal, with Lord Denning presiding,
overturned the High Court on the grounds that the headmaster
The House of Lords
was not guilty of racial discri~nination.'~~
overturned the Court of Appeal.lsO
The House of Lords decision was not based on any general
right to religious liberty (because none exists in English law)
but on the fact that the "no turban rule" violated the RRA 1976
requirement that such a rule must be justifiable "irrespective of
the color, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins of that
person to whom it is applied."lsl The headmaster had argued,
in the words of Lord Fraser, that, "the turban is objectionable
just because it is a manifestation of the . . . appellants ethnic
origins."152 The headmaster also regarded the turban "as an
outward manifestation of a non-Christian faith. Indeed he regarded it as amounting to a challenge to their faith." Even
though Lord Fraser sympathized with the headmaster's argument and "would have been glad to find that the no-turban rule
was justified within the meaning of the statute," he felt that it
could not be justified under existing legislation.ls3
The importance of this decision for religious liberty lies in
the elastic meaning that the House of Lords gave to "ethnic origins" to enable the Act to give protection to religious minorities.
This at once demonstrates the artificiality of these categories
as far as religious freedom is concerned. Lord Fraser found that
the Sikhs would qualify as an ethnic group because the term
"ethnic" has come to be commonly used in a sense appreciably
wider than the strictly racial or biological. According to Lord
Fraser, this wider definition is "consistent with the ordinary
experience of those who read newspapers at the present day. In
my opinion, the word 'ethnic' still retains a racial flavour but it
is nowadays used in an extended sense."lM
For a group to be ethnic, continued Lord Fraser, it must be
regarded by others "as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics" of which some are essential and others are

149. 1983 Q.B. 1.
150. Mandla, [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548.
151. This is the provision of "indirect discrimination" in section l(b)(ii) of the
1976 Act. It is to be noted that the wearing of turbans is de regeur for orthodox
Sikhs. See supra text accompanying note 56.
152. Mandla, [I9831 2 App. Cas. at 566 (Lord Fraser).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 562.
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not.ls5 The essential characteristics are "(1) a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from
other groups, and the memory of which keeps it alive [and] (2)
a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with
religious obser~ance."'~~
Nonessential but relevant factors
include:
(3) either a common geographical origin, or descent from a
small number of common ancestors; (4) a common language,
not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a common literature
peculiar to the group; (6) a common religion different from
that of the neighbouring groups or from the general community surrounding it; (7) being a minority or being a n oppressed
or a dominant group within a larger comm~nity.'~'

Based on these factors, Lord Fraser expressly endorsed the
finding of the judge of first instance that:
[tlhe evidence shows that Sikhs are a distinctive and selfconscious community. They have a history going back to the
15th century. They have a written language which a small
proportion of Sikhs can read but which can be read by a much
higher proportion of Sikhs than Hindus. They were a t one
time politically supreme in the P ~ n j a b . ' ~ ~

In adopting this conclusion, Lord Fraser was influenced and
"greatly strengthened" by the decision in the New Zealand
Court of Appeal in the case of King-Ansell v. Police, in which
Judge Richardson held that, "a group is identifiable in terms of
its ethnic origins if it is a segment of the population distinguished from others by sufficient combination of shared customs, beliefs, traditions and characteristics derived from a
common or presumed past."lsg
Under this definition of "ethnic", Sikhs were given "the
protection which Parliament evidently intended the Act to
afford to them."160 Lord Templeman agreed that the Sikhs
qualified as an ethnic group protected by the Act, but noted

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 565.
159. King-Ansell v. Police, [I9721 2 N.Z.L.R.,531. It is interesting how often
the British Courts look to other jurisdictions for assistance on these matters.
160. Mandla, [I9831 2 App. Cas. at 565 (Lord Fraser).
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that "ethnic" includes racial elements. He thus demonstrated
some of the elusive difficulties of using a racial discrimination
act to proscribe religious discrimination. He obsenred,
for the purposes of the [Race Relations Act] a group of persons defined by reference to ethnic origins must possess some
of the characteristics of a race, namely group descent, a group
of geographical origin and a group history. The evidence
shows that Sikhs satisfy these tests. They are more than a
religious sect, they are almost a race and almost a nation. As
a race, the Sikhs share a common color, and a common physique based on common ancestors from that part of the
Punjab which is centered on Amritsar. They fail to qualify as
a separate race because in racial origin prior to the inception
of Sikhism they cannot be distinguished from other inhabitants of the Punjab. As a nation the Sikhs defeated the Moguls, and established a kingdom in the Punjab which they
lost as result of the first and second Sikh wars; they fail to
qualify as a separate nation or as a separate nationality because their kingdom never achieved a sufEcient degree of
recognition and permanence. The Sikhs qualify as a group
defined by ethnic origins because they constitute a separate
and distinct community derived from the racial characteristics
I have mentioned.l6l

Lord Fraser similarly noted that the term "ethnic" includes
a racial element. He recognized that the Odord English Dictionary (1897) defined "ethnic" as "[plertaining to race" and that
the term "conveys a flavour of race."lB2He also acknowledged
that "the briefest glance a t the evidence . . . is enough to show
that, within the human race, there are few, if any, distinctions
which are scientifically recognized as racial."lB3The Sikhs, for
example, are no more a racial group than the Jews, which
illustrates that the "ethnic origins" analysis is distinctly unhelpful. The Jews have been the most persecuted minority in
history on account of their alleged race, yet Jewish tradition
maintains that the Messiah will come through David, whose
mother, Ruth, was a Moabite convert to Judaism-the clearest
evidence that racial purity is no part of Judaism.lM
161. Id. at 569 (Lord Templeman).
162. Id. at 562 (Lord Fraser).
163. Id. at 561 (Lord kaser).
164. In Seide v. Gillette Indus., 1980 I.R.L.R.427, 430, the absence of discrimination on religious grounds from the 1976 Act had raised the question whether
Jews were protected by it. In debate on the first 1965 Act, the Home Secretary
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It is submitted that what distinguishes Jews from others is
what distinguishes Sikhs from others, and that is their faith
and the history of their faith. Jews bear the physical characteristics of their place of origin. Scandinavian Jews look like Scandinavians, Chinese Jews look like Chinese, Moroccan Jews look
like Moroccans and Indian Jews look like Indians. Similarly,
the Sikhs look like other people from the Punjab with whom
they share a common ancestry. Clearly neither the Jews or the
Sikhs are a race. Consequently, they cannot rely on the race
relations legislation for protection against discrimination.
Though the Race Relations Act was intended to shield Sikhs
from discrimination, because the Act did not intend to proscribe
religious discrimination, the Act provides only unreliable security for Sikhs' religious liberties.
Cases subsequent to Mandla have permitted discrimination against Sikhs, thus illustrating the inadequacy of the protection afforded by the Race Relations Act. For example, an
Industrial Tribunal recently held that British Steel General
Steels, could l a f i l l y dismiss an orthodox Sikh for refusal to
wear a hard hat over his turban,16' and a Sikh employed at a
British Rail Engineering Workshop was demoted for failure to
Both these cases have echoes of a prewear a b~rnp-cap.'~~
Mandla case where the Court of Appeal held that a rule forbidding the wearing of beards in a chocolate factory was justifiable

was clear that "[ilt is certainly the intention of the Government that people of
Jewish faith should be covered." See HOUSE OF COMMONS
DEBATES,May 3, 1965,
a t cols. 932-3. However, Mr. N. St. JohnStevas (a constitutional expert and now a
peer) believed that "the Jewish identity is essentially a religious one." See HOUSE
OF COMMONS,
STANDING
C O ~ B, E
May 27, 1965, a t col. 70. When the Home
Secretary, Sir Frank Soskice, was asked what the word "ethnic" contributed to the
expression "color, race or ethnic or national origins," he replied:
We have chosen that connotation of words to try to ensure that we include every possible minority group in the country . . . We hope, by the
use of the word 'ethnic' to cover everybody who is neither of a particular
national origin nor of a particular racial origin but who would be distinguishable by color.
Id. While the Act thus intended to protect Sikhs from discrimination, the Act clearly did not intend to proscribe religious discrimination, whether ethnically defined or
not.
165. S.S. Dhanjal v. British Steel General Steels, Industrial Tribunal Case No.
50740/91 (December 11, 1993) (unreported).
166. Safety Rules Justifv Turban Discrimination: Kuldeep Singh v. British Rail
Engineering Ltd., THE TIMES(London), August 6, 1985. It was after this case that
the British Sikh Federation was able to get an exemption from the Government in
section 11 of the Employment Act 1989 which required the wearing of hard hats
on constmction sites.
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under the RRA on hygienic grounds even though it affected
Sikhs more directly than others."' Clearly Mandla and the
racial relations legislation have proved an insufficient barrier
to infringements on religious liberties.

Britain urgently needs an express affirmation of the
individual's right to religious liberty. Britain needs this in the
form of a religious freedom statute that places the onus upon
the state to show a compelling interest for any encroachment
upon a person's religious expression.168 Such legislation
would be compatible with Britain's tradition of effecting constitutional change through ordinary statutes passed in Parliament?' The Sikh right to religious freedom will not be secure unless such legislation is passed. Britain's experience with
the three Race Relations Acts demonstrates that race relations
legislation is of little avail unless it is coupled with legislation
to protect religious liberty.'"
Racial and ethnic justice must go hand in hand with religious justice. Without the one, the other will be less effective.
Racial and ethnic minorities are often also religious minorities.
In this, Britain's experience has mirrored that of America.
Smith concerned Native Indians;17' Yang in 1990 concerned
and
~ M u n n in 1991 involved &can-Amerithe H ~ n o n g ; ' ~
cans.lT3In Britain, ethnic minority groups, such as the Sikhs,
have figured prominently in religious freedom cases.'" However, the comparison between these two countries also shows
that if the device of a Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) was deemed necessary in a country like America, it is
deemed doubly necessary in Britain.
In America the RFRA applies a uniform standard to all
faiths, confemng no particular advantage or disadvantage on
In Britain, the inequality is
any faith or any state intere~t.'?~

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
(1991).
174.
175.

Panesar v. Nestle Co., 1980 I.C.R. 144.
See supra introduction.
See supra parts III.B.l-6.
See s u p m parts 1V.C-E. (discussing difficulties and uncertainties).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U S . 872 (1990).
Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277
See s u p m notes 163-165.
The reader is referred again to the wording of the RFRk See supra note
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already formally enshrined in law.lT6One faith is already favored over another. State interest already predominates over
religion.17' In these circumstances, the need for religious freedom legislation is far greater in Britain. The Sikh example is a
testament to that. Britain has had a long and illustrious history. It has contributed handsomely to the constitutional rights
and liberties of many countries. But the Sikh experience shows
that seams in the fabric of British constitutional law are beginning to separate.
To counteract this trend, Britain will inevitably need for
the long term to reduce to writing its unwritten rules, and in
the process, modernize its system. This would be a perfectly
logical step in Britain's historical progression-unless history is
to be allowed to stand still. Britain had a Bill of Rights in 1688
that suited the exigencies of its day, and Britain had a constitutional framework in Cromwell's Instrument of Government in
1653 and still has such a framework in the Union with Scotland Acts. The logical step is to update the Bill of Rights and
build on the constitutional framework as Britain moves to
closer union with the European Communities on an entirely
new footing.
In Britain's present system, it is easier to pass religious
freedom legislation. The RRA is not able to do this work. For
the Sikhs, Mandla was the high-point of protection of their
religious freedom. Yet as a vehicle for promoting their religious
rights, Mandla was, and still remains, defective even though
the language of their Lordships was an accolade to the Sikhs as
a people. What is needed is specific legislation on religious
liberty in Britain like the RFRA in America. Law is a precise
science and the precise recognition of legal rights is important
in this area. Race relations legislation is a poor substitute, and
its tortuous extension into this area only underscores the
state's inability to distinguish between racial issues and religious issues in a country where one religion alone has the full
sanction of the law as the established church of the state.

25.
176. The clearest example of this is the Union with Scotland Acts. See supra
part III.B.6.
177. The state in Britain will never have to justify why it has taken action
that indirectly infringes religious rights. There is no onus on it to show a compelling interest. An example of this is seen in the discussion of the Road Traf3ic Act
1972. See supra pp. 43-44.
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As for the Act of Settlement of 1700, this is bound to be
repealed one day, and that day is likely to be sooner rather
than later. What makes the Act impossible is not simply the
fact that Britain now has a political system that makes religious discrimination by the state unacceptable, but the fact
that a natural heir to the throne may become ineligible purely
for reasons of religious faith if he marries a Catholic.'" Ironically, this issue is far more likely to catalyze change in Britain
than any concern over Sikh religious rights.17gYet it is clear
that constitutional reform is inevitable in Britain and it is
inevitable for purely practical reasons of this kind.

178. This is proscribed for in a series of statutes from the seventeenth century. See supra parts III.B.l-4. The separation of Prince Charles from Princess Diana
and the divorce of Mrs. Camilla Parker-Bowles, a Catholic, from her husband-with
whom Prince Charles has been linked-lays open the possibility that the Prince
may eventually want to many her. This is something which under existing law he
cannot do. The severest restraint on the right of any member of the Royal Family
to marry, divorce and re-marry is imposed by the Royal Marriages Act 1772 (12
Geo. 3 ch. 1).
179. There has been widespread concern in the British media about the possibility of a potential monarch marrying a Catholic. See THE INDEPENDENT (London),
December 10, 1993; THE TIMES (London), December 8, 1993; and THE GUARDIAN
(London), January 7, 1995.

